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Abstract
Female genital cutting (FGC) is a practice in which a womans genitalia are partially
or totally removed for nonmedical reasons. Undergoing FGC can have serious physical
and psychological health consequences. Yet the practice persists in West Africa because
of beliefs about beauty, cleanliness, purity, and fidelity. In my three dissertation essays,
I (1) test the prevailing theory regarding why FGC persists and I reject that theory,
(2) generate an new theoretical explanation for why the norm persists and test the
theory with observational data, and (3) investigate the relationship between a woman’s
characteristics (e.g., religion, education level, age) and her likelihood of opposing FGC
even if she has undergone FGC herself.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Female genital cutting (FGC) is a practice in which a woman’s genitalia are partially
or totally removed for nonmedical reasons. The practice is prevalent in parts of Africa,
the Middle East, and Asia as well as among immigrant communities in the United
States, Canada, and Europe. Undergoing FGC can have serious health consequences:
Women who have undergone FGC are more than twice as likely to experience birthing
complications (Jones et al., 1999) and are 25 percent more likely to contract sexually
transmitted diseases (Wagner, 2015). Moreover, undergoing FGC can cause anxiety,
depression, chronic irritability, marital conflict (Dorkenoo, 1999), and even post-traumatic
stress disorder (Behrendt and Moritz, 2005). Such physical and psychological health
complications can have real impacts on the educational attainment and labor market
outcomes. Psychiatric disorders are correlated with dropping out of school (Kessler
et al., 1995) and PTSD is related to unemployment (Savoca and Rosenheck, 2000).
These education and labor market consequences suggest that FGC could contribute to
economic underdevelopment in communities in which FGC is practiced.
Non-governmental organizations have created campaigns to inform individuals of the
risks associated with FGC and governments have even adopted official bans of FGC in
order to curb the practice. Yet the practice persists for reasons such as community beliefs
about beauty and cleanliness as well as purity and fidelity (Shell-Duncan and Hernlund,
2001). Because of these beliefs, families fear that their daughters will be scorned by
their community or may have poor marriage prospects if they have not undergone FGC.
Indeed, in the 13 West African countries that I study in my dissertation, women who
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have undergone FGC are 13 percent more likely to get married (Wagner, 2015). With
these social expectations in play, it is perhaps not surprising that three million girls
worldwide undergo the procedure every year (World Health Organization, 2012).
The prevailing theory regarding why the norm persists is that the practice is a social
coordination norm—that is, a household will deviate from the norm if and only if a
sufficient portion of their community members also agree to abandon the practice (Mackie,
1996). This theory has been influential in the policy discussions surrounding FGC.
Organizations that design interventions according to this theory encourage community
members to participate in public declarations in which community members declare that
their households will no longer practice FGC. According to the social coordination norm
theory, if a sufficient proportion of households agree to abandon the practice, a tipping
point is reached and the rate of FGC should rapidly decline.
In the first essay of my dissertation, I test the hypothesis generated by this theory
that the the persistence of FGC can be largely attributed to the community. I reject this
hypothesis. In the second essay of my dissertation, I derive a new data-supported theory
regarding why FGC persists. The crux of this theory is preference heterogeneity, that is,
if households have heterogenous preferences for FGC a tipping point in the rate of FGC
is far from guaranteed. Because I show that households have heterogenous preferences, I
dedicate my third essay to exploring which women are most likely to deviate from the
norm of FGC. Specifically, which characteristics of women predict their support for the
perpetuation, or abandonment, of the practice. This will better inform the targeting of
interventions aimed at reducing the prevalence of FGC.
In each of the three dissertation essays, I use nationally representative datasets from
USAID’s Demographic and Health Survey and UNICEF’s Multiple Indicator Cluster
Survey that include information about women aged 15 to 49. My first essay includes
information from 38 repeated cross-section country-year datasets covering 13 West
African countries between the years 1995 and 2013. These datasets provide information
about whether a woman has undergone FGC, her opinion of FGC, her education level,
and many characteristics about the household and village in which she lives. My second
and third essays use a subset of these datasets.
While much research has been conducted regarding how FGC emerged and evolved
into a common practice (Mackie, 1996) as well as the effects of FGC (Wagner, 2015;
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Jones et al., 1999; Dorkenoo, 1999), relatively little research has focused on identifying
why households continue to practice FGC. Furthermore, no studies have yet identified
which women are most likely to change their opinions and become pioneers in eliminating
the practice. It is crucial to know how opinions about FGC are formed and what affects
perceptions of FGC in order to generate public policy that promotes change in the
practice.
My contribution to the literature is threefold. First, I test the theory that FGC is a
social coordination norm (Mackie, 1996). I show that this theory is not supported by
data from West Africa. In fact, 87 percent of the variation in the persistence of FGC can
be attributed to individual and household characteristics rather than village or region
characteristics. Furthermore, individual factors explain a larger share of the persistence
in countries in which the rate of FGC is highest. Lastly, women who have undergone
FGC are only 16 percentage points more likely to be in favor of the practice than women
who have not undergone the procedure.
Second, I generate a new theoretical explanation for why FGC persists, and I test
that theory with data from Burkina Faso. I show that households have heterogeneous
thresholds in the rate of FGC in their community. I define the threshold to be the the
rate of cutting in a community at which a household is indifferent between cutting and
not cutting its daughter. I show that this heterogeneity in household thresholds has
important implications for if and how the norm should subside. Specifically, a tipping
point in the rate of FGC in a community is far from guaranteed. The distribution of
thresholds in some communities suggest that there is a tipping point in the rate of FGC
and that tipping point has already been reached. In these communities, FGC will likely
be eliminated quickly. In other communities, there is a stable internal equilibrium in the
rate of FGC suggesting that the rate of FGC may remain constant for the foreseeable
future until an external shock changes household preferences.
Third, using data from 13 West African countries, I identify which women are most
likely to oppose FGC even when they have undergone the practice themselves. I show
that educated women are less likely to support FGC than uneducated women in all nine
countries with a rate of FGC above 35 percent. Muslim women are more likely than
Christian women to support FGC in the seven countries with rates of FGC above 42
percent. With this information, policy makers can better target interventions.
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Together these essays shed light on why FGC persists and who is most likely to
perpetuate the practice. Future research should prioritize testing interventions that aim
to reduce the prevalence of FGC. The design of these interventions should pay special
attention to who is targeted and researchers should draw careful conclusions based on
the targeted populations.
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Chapter 2
All in the Family: Explaining the
Persistence of Female Genital
Cutting in West Africa∗
2.1 Introduction
Why does the practice of female genital cutting (FGC),1 in which a woman’s genitalia is
partially or totally removed for nonmedical reasons, persist in certain places even though
it has been generally declining elsewhere (UNICEF, 2013)? Although more than 100
million women have undergone FGC and an additional three million girls experience
the procedure every year worldwide (World Health Organization, 2012), social scientists
only have a limited understanding of the reasons why FGC persists (Hayford, 2005).
Yet the potential physiological impacts of FGC are widely documented. According
to (Skaine, 2005), FGC can:
∗This chapter was written in collaboration with Marc Bellemare, Department of Applied Economics
at the University of Minnesota and Tara Steinmetz, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics,
University of California, Davis
1Many terms are used to describe the procedure examined in this study, including “female genital
cutting,” “female genital mutilation,” and “female circumcision.” “Female genital mutilation” is largely
used by opponents of the practice, and carries with it an underlying negative judgment of the tradition,
a moral judgment well outside the scope of our empirical investigation. “Female circumcision” tends to
imply a tradition similar to the more familiar male circumcision, a comparison that can be misleading
depending on the type of cutting referred to. Therefore, except when directly citing other sources, we
favor the expression “female genital cutting”.
5
“cause severe scarring that causes an obstruction during delivery. If infection
is present at the time of the procedure in [clitoridectomy] and [excision],
possible vulval adhesions can form that narrow or obstruct the vaginal
opening and make labor long. The herbal pessaries used in [other types of
FGC] and the use of rock salt after early pregnancies to reduce the vagina
may result in severe scarring and stenosis.”
Studies in Mali and Burkina Faso have documented the negative health impacts
associated with having undergone FGC: compared to the 5 percent of uncut women who
experience birthing complications, 18 to 30 percent of women who have undergone FGC
experience similar complications (Jones et al. 1999). Moreover, some speculate that the
practice also has psychological consequences such as decreased trust in caregivers and
relationship problems stemming from painful intercourse due to infibulation (Jones et al.,
1999; Shell-Duncan and Hernlund, 2006). Others surmise that the psychological damage
inflicted by FGC is deeply embedded in the consciousness of those who have undergone
the practice and that “[i]n the longer term, women may suffer anxiety, depression, chronic
irritability, frigidity, and marital conflicts” (Dorkenoo, 1999). Lastly, others assert that,
regardless of health or psychological damage, FGC is a violation of human rights (Moore
et al., 1997), and that “[s]uppression and control over women’s sexuality are demeaning
to women and deny an aspect of their humanity” (Skaine, 2005).
Our results suggest that among women aged 15 to 49 in West Africa, the bulk of
support for FGC—87 percent on average for the period 1995 to 2013—is due to household-
and individual-level factors. Indeed, the total contribution from those levels of variation
ranges from a low of 71 percent in Nigeria in 2011 to a high of 93 percent in Burkina
Faso in 2006. Put differently, only about 12 percent of the variation in support for FGC
among women aged 15 to 49 can be explained by village-level factors on average (the
remaining 1 percent is due to variation at levels beyond that of the village). Moreover,
our results suggest that a woman who has undergone FGC is 16 percentage points more
likely to support the continuance of the practice, a figure which is obtained by averaging
our estimates of that increase in likelihood over the 38 country-year data sets for the
most complete specification we estimate in this chapter.
The practice of FGC is of economic interest for a number of reasons. First, given the
physiological and psychological consequences of FGC discussed above, FGC is likely to
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have real consequences on the health, educational attainment, labor market outcomes,
and productivity of women in societies where the practice is widespread, which means
that FGC can contribute to underdevelopment. Second, there is a substantial line of
research in economics focusing on how social norms emerge and evolve. For North (1990),
a social norm like FGC is an institution, a “humanly devised constraint that shape[s]
human interaction,” and “structure[s] incentives in human exchange, whether political,
social, or economic” (North, 1990, p.3). For Ellickson (1989, 1991), social norms emerge
and evolve so as to minimize transaction costs and maximize social welfare.2 Third,
FGC is often associated with (and seemingly sustained by) marriage market prospects:
in places where the practice is common, men often expect their future wife to have
undergone FGC, and Wagner (2015) finds that women who report having undergone FGC
are 40 percent more likely to get married in the 13 African countries we study. Lastly,
understanding what drives the persistence of FGC in different countries can provide
some insight about the (potentially nonlinear) dynamics of FGC persistence. Following
tipping point and informational cascade models (Schelling, 1978; Bikhchandani et al.,
1992, 1998), the decision to abandon FGC might follow a logistic growth path, and so in
places where the practice is widespread the decision to abandon FGC might be entirely
due to individual-level factors, whereas it might be increasingly driven by higher-level
(e.g., village, region, country) factors as the practice becomes less common, perhaps
reverting back to becoming an individual-level decision when the practice becomes very
uncommon. Consequently, we conclude by using our results to speculate as to whether
this is the case for FGC in West Africa, and find that it is not. Indeed, our data suggest
that as FGC becomes more and more pervasive over time and space, individual-level
factors increasingly appear to contribute to the practice’s persistence in our data.
Our contribution is thus threefold. First, we quantify the contribution that each
level of variation (i.e., individual, household, village, and beyond) has on the persistence
of FGC as we define it in our analysis. Second, we study the relationship between
reporting having undergone FGC and support for the practice. Third, and perhaps most
importantly, this study is among one of the first contributions of economics to the study
of FGC, along with De Cao and Lutz (2015), Naguib (2012), Wagner (2015).
2That said, a discussion of which exact transaction costs were being minimized when FGC first
emerged in human societies must necessarily remain speculative due to the paucity of historical data on
the practice, and is thus beyond the scope of this chapter.
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The strength of our approach lies in the survey design of the data we use. The data
cover over 300,000 women aged 15 to 49 across 38 repeated country-year cross-sections
of households in West Africa for the period 1995 to 2013. There is more than one
respondent in a substantial number of households in each country-year cross-section, and
there is sufficient within-household variation in whether respondents support the practice
to incorporate region, village and, ultimately, household fixed effects.3 This allows us to
quantify the contribution of each level of variation (i.e., individual, household, village,
and beyond) to the persistence of FGC as we define it here.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides some background
on FGC for those readers who may not be familiar with the practice, and then discusses
the data and provides some descriptive statistics. In section 2.3, we present our empirical
framework, the strategy we use to quantify the contribution of each level of variation, and
our identification strategy. Section 2.4 presents estimation results, compares the results
among the countries included in our analysis, briefly speculates about the nonlinear
dynamics involved in FGC persistence, and discusses the limitations of our approach. In
section 2.5, we conclude with some directions for future research.
2.2 Background, Data, and Descriptive Statistics
The practice of FGC is widespread throughout Africa, Asia, and the Middle East,4
but it is also a public health concern in the United States, the United Kingdom, and
other developed countries (Black and Debelle, 1995; Jones et al., 1997; National Public
Radio, 2004). Individuals from where FGC is widespread often import the practice with
themselves when they migrate, and practice “back-alley” FGCs on girls born to their
communities (Black and Debelle, 1995; US Department of Health and Human Services,
2009).5
3We discuss the amount of within-household variation in the dependent variable in Section 2.2.1
4Cases of FGC have been reported in Benin, Burkina Faso, Coˆte d’Ivoire, the Central African Republic,
Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Liberia, Malaysia,
Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, the United
Arab Emirates, and Yemen (Black and Debelle, 1995; Dorkenoo, 1999; Hayford, 2005; Hernlund and
Shell-Duncan, 2007; Jackson et al., 2003; Mackie, 1996; Shell-Duncan and Hernlund, 2006).
5Historically, FGC has been practiced in the United States as early as the 1860s. (James, 1998, 1037)
“[i]mmediately following the Civil War. . . [b]ecause women’s ‘mental disorders’ were equated with their
sexual organs, one ‘cure’ adopted in the late 1860s was clitoridectomy.”
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In its typology of FGC, the World Health Organization distinguishes between four
types of FGC. In the first type (clitoridectomy), the clitoris is partially or totally removed.
In the second type (excision), both the clitoris and the labia are partially or totally
removed. In the third type (infibulation), the vaginal opening is narrowed by sewing
or stitching the labia together. The fourth type of FGC is a residual category of sorts,
which covers any FGC-type procedure that does not neatly fit in any of the first three
categories, and which usually involves any of “pricking, piercing, incising, scraping and
cauterizing the genital area” (World Health Organization, 2012). The procedure can
take place at any time between birth and the age of 15, but this varies widely, both
between and within countries (US Department of Health and Human Services, 2009;
Yount, Kathryn, 2002). As a US Department of Health and Human Services (2009)
fact-sheet on FGC notes:
“Most often, FGC happens before a girl reaches puberty. Sometimes, however,
it is done just before marriage or during a woman’s first pregnancy. In Egypt,
about 90 percent of girls are cut between 5 and 14 years old. However, in
Yemen, more than 75 percent of girls are cut before they are 2 weeks old. The
average age at which a girl undergoes FGC is decreasing in some countries
(Burkina Faso, Coˆte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Kenya, and Mali).”
The West African context is well-suited to study the persistence of FGC. Our 38
data sets, which are all designed to be representative at the national level, show that
55 percent of the women across the 13 countries (and 38 country-years) in West Africa
retained for analysis have undergone FGC. This number masks a considerable amount
of heterogeneity, however, given that the prevalence of FGC at the country level ranges
from 3 percent in Niger in 2012 to 99 percent in Guinea in 1999. Given the prevalence of
FGC in West Africa as well as the sharp differences just discussed among West African
countries, West Africa constitutes an ideal setting to study FGC.
2.2.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Depending on the country-year, the data come either from the Demographic and Health
Surveys (DHS) collected by USAID or from the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS)
collected by UNICEF. Both USAID and UNICEF work with in-country partners; those
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partners are often the country’s national statistical agency or another government entity.
The DHS and MICS use very similar and consistent data collection practices that make
the data comparable across countries and time. The countries included in the analysis
are all West African countries for which comparable data exist. For each country we
include all available survey years that contain information on FGC. Those countries
(survey: year) are Benin (DHS: 2001, DHS: 2006, DHS: 2011–2012), Burkina Faso (DHS:
1998, DHS: 2003, MICS: 2006, DHS: 2010), Coˆte d’Ivoire (DHS: 1998, MICS: 2006, DHS,
2011–2012), The Gambia (MICS: 2005, MICS: 2010), Ghana (MICS: 2006, MICS: 2011),
Guinea (DHS: 1999, DHS: 2005, DHS: 2012), Guinea-Bissau (MICS: 2006), Mali (DHS:
1995, DHS: 2001, DHS: 2006, DHS: 2012), Niger (DHS: 1998, DHS: 2006, DHS: 2012),
Nigeria (DHS: 1999, DHS: 2003, MICS: 2007, DHS: 2008, MICS: 2011, DHS: 2013),
Senegal (DHS: 2005, DHS: 2010–2011), Sierra Leone (MICS: 2005, DHS: 2008, MICS:
2010), and Togo (MICS: 2006, MICS: 2010). Cape Verde6 and Liberia7 are excluded
from the analysis due to a lack of data.
Selection of respondents within clusters (i.e., villages) was random, with few refusals
to participate in the survey. See section A.1 of the appendix for a discussion of how
many women were identified, selected for survey, and were ultimately surveyed in each
country. Response rates range from 99.0 percent (Coˆte d’Ivoire in 2006) to 80.9 percent
(Guinea-Bissau in 2006). Sampling weights based on these response rates are provided
in each DHS and MICS dataset to make the sample nationally representative. We use
those weights throughout our analysis.
See section A.2 of the appendix for a discussion of slight variations in data availability
and quality for the various datasets. Section A.3 of the appendix includes a discussion
of the systematic differences (or lack thereof) between the women included and not
included in the sample. Women are dropped from the sample due to missing data (i.e.,
6Cape Verde (DHS, 2005) is not included because USAID decided against distributing data for Cape
Verde as part of the DHS program due to serious problems which were identified in a high proportion of
the questionnaires. The MICS program does not have a dataset for Cape Verde.
7Liberia is not included in the analysis because, due to the particularly sensitive nature of discussing
FGC in Liberia, the questionnaire does not include a question that asks if the respondent has undergone
FGC. Instead the enumerators ask if the respondent is a member of the Sande society, which is a bush
school for young girls at which most undergo FGC. Membership in the Sande society could serve as a
proxy indicator for FGC status. More damning for the inclusion of Liberia is the fact that the survey
includes a question about a respondent’s beliefs about the Sande society only if she is a member of it.
Thus, we do not have information on our outcome variable for women who are not members of the Sande
society. The DHS program does not have a dataset for Liberia that includes information on FGC.
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a lack of response to key variables). The most notable and common difference between
included and non-included women is age and education level. We find that, in general,
older women in the 15 to 49 age range and more educated women are more likely to
respond to the question regarding whether they believe the practice of FGC should
continue and the question regarding their personal FGC status. This is important to
keep in mind, as our results are slightly more indicative of older and more educated
women.
Columns 1 and 2 of table 2.1 present the descriptive statistics for the dependent
variable (i.e., a dummy for whether the respondent believes that the practice of FGC
should continue) and the variable of interest (i.e., a dummy variable for whether the
respondent reports having undergone FGC). Guinea in 1999 claims the highest prevalence
rate of FGC, with 99 percent of respondents stating that they have undergone FGC.
Sierra Leone in 2005 professes the highest level of support for the practice, with 86
percent of respondents stating that they are in favor of the practice continuing. Niger in
2012 has the lowest prevalence of FGC with only 3 percent of respondents stating that
they have undergone FGC, while Benin in 2006 had the lowest level of support for FGC,
with only 2 percent of women stating that the practice should continue. All means and
standard errors are weighted using the sampling weights discussed above.
Tables 2a to 2al of the online appendix8 include descriptive statistics for all variables
included in the analysis for each country and year of survey. Variables included in the
analysis for each country and year of survey are age of the respondent, highest level
of education attained by the respondent, marital status of the respondent, household
ownership of a television and/or radio, household access to electricity, area of residence
(rural or urban), ethnicity (of the respondent for DHS datasets and of the household
head for the MICS datasets), and religion (of the respondent for DHS datasets and of
the household head for MICS datasets).
Columns 3 and 4 of table 2.1 present the proportion of households with intrahousehold
variation in FGC status and support for the practice, which we exploit in order to study
the persistence of FGC in this context. The majority of country-years retained for our
analysis have sufficient variation—both between and within households—to estimate
the relationship between a woman’s report of her own FGC status and her beliefs
8Online supplementary material can be found at http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2015.06.001.
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about whether the practice should continue. Some countries, however, have very little
within-household variation, which means that although it is in principle possible to
estimate specifications with household fixed effects, those estimates should be taken with
the requisite amount of caution, as they are likely to be imprecisely estimated. The
country-years with the least within-household variation are Niger in 2012 and Nigeria in
2011.
Tables 7a to 7y of the online appendix show the relationship of the respondent to the
household head. Note that the MICS datasets do not include this variable, thus we can
only comment on relationship to household head for countries and years for which DHS
supplied the data. The majority of respondents are the wife of the household head.9 A
substantial portion of respondents are the daughter or daughter-in-law of the household
head. Some respondents are the household head. A small number of respondents are the
mother, mother-in-law, or co-spouse of the household head.
Lastly, table 8 of the online appendix shows the percent of women aged 15 to 49
who ascribe to a religion and report having undergone FGC or are in support of the
practice. In the majority of countries, Muslim women are more likely to undergo FGC
than women in the same country that ascribe to a different religion. The two exceptions
to this are Niger and Nigeria, in which FGC is practiced and supported more among
Christian women than Muslim women aged 15 to 49. In countries in which FGC is highly
prevalent, FGC is practiced and supported by women from all religions. For example,
in Sierra Leone, which has one of the highest rates of FGC, a large proportion of both
Christian and Muslim women aged 15 to 49 report having undergone FGC and support
the practice. We have not generated a similar table for ethnicity because many ethnic
groups are only present in one or two countries, which makes cross-country comparisons
more burdensome and less interesting.
2.3 Empirical Framework
As we noted in the introduction, our data allow us to do two things. First, they allow us
to quantify the contribution of each level of variation (i.e., individual, household, village,
9Note that the MICS datasets do not include this variable, thus we can only comment on relationship
to household head for countries and years for which DHS supplied the data.
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and beyond) has on the persistence of FGC as we define it in our analysis, i.e., support
for the continuance of FGC. Second, they allow us to look at the relationship between
whether a woman reports having undergone FGC and her support for the practice. We
discuss how we do both of these things in turn.
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics and intrahousehold variation for FGC variables—West
Africa (n=38 Country–Year Observations)
Country-Year Proportion of
Respondents
who underwent
FGC
(Std. Err.)
Proportion of
Respondents
who Think
FGC should
continue
(Std. Err.)
Proportion of
Households
with
intrahousehold
variation in
support for
FGC
Proportion of
Households
with
intrahousehold
variation in
FGC status of
respondents
Benin 2001 0.248 0.056 0.019 0.032
(0.027) (0.007)
Benin 2006 0.229 0.017 0.006 0.031
(0.017) (0.002)
Benin 2011 0.134 0.025 0.005 0.025
(0.011) (0.003)
Burkina Faso 1998 0.841 0.206 0.093 0.062
(0.012) (0.012)
Burkina Faso 2003 0.744 0.144 0.103 0.111
(0.016) (0.008)
Burkina Faso 2006 0.745 0.137 0.083 0.112
(0.020) (0.010)
Burkina Faso 2010 0.746 0.073 0.043 0.099
(0.011) (0.004)
Coˆte d’Ivoire 1998 0.440 0.267 0.113 0.077
(0.030) (0.020)
Coˆte d’Ivoire 2006 0.452 0.272 0.077 0.072
(0.029) (0.026)
Coˆte d’Ivoire 2011 0.447 0.152 0.051 0.068
(0.028) (0.015)
Gambia 2005 0.824 0.770 0.056 0.027
(0.014) (0.016)
Gambia 2010 0.790 0.676 0.126 0.034
(0.019) (0.018)
Continued on next page
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Table 2.1 (continued)
Country-Year Proportion of
Respondents
who underwent
FGC
(Std. Err.)
Proportion of
Respondents
who Think
FGC should
continue
(Std. Err.)
Proportion of
Households
with
intrahousehold
variation in
support for
FGC
Proportion of
Households
with
intrahousehold
variation in
FGC status of
respondents
Ghana 2006 0.214 0.037 0.009 0.026
(0.029) (0.005)
Ghana 2011 0.386 0.062 0.006 0.016
(0.024) (0.008)
Guinea 1999 0.989 0.748 0.099 0.006
(0.003) (0.013)
Guinea 2005 0.978 0.795 0.082 0.020
(0.004) (0.010)
Guinea 2012 0.985 0.769 0.112 0.014
(0.003) (0.014)
Guinea-Bissau 2006 0.508 0.312 0.070 0.027
(0.027) (0.019)
Mali 1995 0.728 0.647 0.060 0.012
(0.037) (0.035)
Mali 2001 0.860 0.787 0.254 0.095
(0.022) (0.021)
Mali 2006 0.852 0.713 0.052 0.016
(0.019) (0.019)
Mali 2012 0.934 0.801 0.052 0.016
(0.006) (0.009)
Niger 1998 0.137 0.259 0.046 0.027
(0.023) (0.025)
Niger 2006 0.041 0.028 0.013 0.015
(0.007) (0.004)
Niger 2012 0.029 0.021 0.007 0.006
(0.005) (0.003)
Nigeria 1999 0.332 0.22 0.025 0.025
(0.024) (0.017)
Nigeria 2003 0.326 0.509 0.046 0.045
(0.022) (0.026)
Nigeria 2007 0.389 0.176 0.028 0.043
Continued on next page
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Table 2.1 (continued)
Country-Year Proportion of
Respondents
who underwent
FGC
(Std. Err.)
Proportion of
Respondents
who Think
FGC should
continue
(Std. Err.)
Proportion of
Households
with
intrahousehold
variation in
support for
FGC
Proportion of
Households
with
intrahousehold
variation in
FGC status of
respondents
(0.016) (0.010)
Nigeria 2008 0.425 0.214 0.036 0.038
(0.016) (0.010)
Nigeria 2011 0.439 0.204 0.009 0.010
(0.016) (0.010)
Nigeria 2013 0.378 0.222 0.042 0.049
(0.016) (0.011)
Senegal 2005 0.462 0.295 0.112 0.052
(0.028) (0.021)
Senegal 2010 0.535 0.315 0.121 0.061
(0.025) (0.019)
Sierra Leone 2005 0.954 0.863 0.040 0.023
(0.005) (0.011)
Sierra Leone 2008 0.9 0.673 0.074 0.041
(0.009) (0.021)
Sierra Leone 2010 0.929 0.739 0.029 0.010
(0.008) (0.015)
Togo 2006 0.161 0.048 0.010 0.031
(0.019) (0.006)
Togo 2010 0.139 0.026 0.005 0.026
(0.018) (0.004)
2.3.1 Estimation Strategy
The first equation we estimate is:
yihvr = α1 + γ1Dihvr + β1xihvr + δ1ede + 1ihvr (2.1)
where the subscripts denote individual i in household h in village v in region r, yihvr
denotes our outcome of interest (i.e., whether the respondent would like the practice of
15
FGC to continue), Dihvr is our variable of interest (i.e., whether a respondent reports
having undergone FGC), xihvr is a vector of control variables, de is a vector of interviewer
(or enumerator, hence the subscript e) fixed effects, and ihvr is an error term with mean
zero.
We estimate equation (2.1) by ordinary least squares (OLS), weighting each obser-
vation with the associated probability weights provided in the data and clustering the
standard errors at the village level, given the sampling scheme. Given the binary nature
of the dependent variable, our use of OLS means that every equation estimated in this
chapter is a linear probability model (LPM). Although the LPM might be biased and
inconsistent relative to nonlinear procedures like probit or logit (Horrace and Oaxaca,
2006), we favor it for two reasons. First, recall that we use district–village–household
fixed effects, and there is bias associated with using fixed effects in the context of
nonlinear procedures stemming from the incidental parameter problem (Greene et al.,
2002). Second, although we could focus on specifications without fixed effects, this would
almost surely introduce much more bias due to unobserved heterogeneity than would our
use of an LPM instead of a probit or logit, something that is supported by our empirical
results.
In estimating LPMs, we follow the recommendations of Angrist and Pischke (2008)
for microeconomic applications. There are three clear advantages to estimating LPMs
instead of popular alternatives like probit and logit. First and foremost, a linear procedure
like the LPM is better-suited to handle fixed effects given the incidental parameters
problem associated with the probit (Greene et al., 2002; Heckman, 1981). Second, the
LPM prevents identification via the specific functional form (e.g., normal or logistic)
assumed in a probit or logit. Finally, LPM coefficients are directly interpretable as
marginal effects, i.e., as changes in the probability that Pr(yihvr = 1), whereas probit
and logit coefficients have to be transformed before they can be interpreted as such.
There are some disadvantages to estimating LPMs, however, but we argue that those
disadvantages are offset by the disadvantages associated with probit and logit in this
context. The first disadvantage is that the variance of a binary variable like yihvr has a
Bernoulli structure—i.e., V ar(yihvr) = pihvr(1− pihvr), where pihvr = Pr(yihvr = 1)—so
the LPM is inherently heteroskedastic. Our use of robust standard errors, however,
means that our standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity in general, and not
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just the heteroskedasticity that comes from a binary dependent variable. Second, many
researchers avoid the LPM because it can lead to predicted values of the dependent
variable that lie outside of [0,1] interval. But as Wooldridge (2002) notes, “if the
main purpose is to estimate the partial effect of [a variable of interest] on the response
probability, averaged across the distribution of [the variable of interest], then the fact
that some predicted values are outside the unit interval may not be very important.”
The goal of our analysis is not to predict the probability that an individual respondent
will be in favor of the practice of FGC continuing, but to find an average association
between FGC status and support for FGC.
That said, equation (2.1) does a poor job of controlling for the unobserved hetero-
geneity between respondents. Indeed, many of the characteristics of our respondents are
unobserved, which means that those characteristics are captured by the error term .
But if those unobserved characteristics are correlated with whether a respondent has
undergone FGC, our estimate of γ1 (i.e., the estimate of the impact of a woman having
undergone FGC on whether she wants the practice to continue) will be biased.
In order to obtain a measure of the impact of a woman’s own reported FGC status on
our outcome variables that is as accurate as possible, we incorporate increasingly refined
levels of fixed effects—district, village, and household—in order to filter out unobserved
heterogeneity at the same levels. Thus, the second equation we estimate controls for the
heterogeneity between districts and is:
yihvr = α2 + γ2Dihvr + β2xivhrδ2rdr + δ2ede + 2ihvr (2.2)
where dr is a vector of region or district fixed effects to control for the factors that are
common to all the respondents in a given district.
Equation (2.3) controls for the heterogeneity between villages (and, by construction,
between districts) and is:
yihvr = α3 + γ3Dihvr + β3xihvr + δ3vrdvr + δ3ede + 3ihvr (2.3)
where dvr is a vector of village–district fixed effects to control for the factors that are
common to all the respondents in a given village.
Lastly, equation (2.4) controls for the heterogeneity between households (and, by
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construction, between villages and districts) and is:
yihvr = α4 + γ4Dihvr + β4xihvr + δ4hvr + dhvr + δ4ede + 4ihvr (2.4)
where dhvr is a vector of household–village–district fixed effects to control for the factors
that are common to all the respondents in a given household.
As we explain below, equations (2.1) to (2.4) allow us to (i) quantify the contribution
of each level of variation—individual, household, village, and beyond—to FGC persistence
as we define it here, i.e., whether respondents support the continuance of the practice;
as well as (ii) control for mechanisms of FGC persistence at those levels. For example,
Blaydes and Izama (2015) find that in Egypt, women in households with more sons are
more likely to be in favor of FGC, and they speculate that having more sons invests
women more heavily in patriarchal values.10 Our use of household fixed effects would
control for such a mechanism for FGC persistence, because it would hold constant the
number of sons in a given household.
Our progressive use of increasingly refined layers of fixed effects also allows for
quantification of the contribution of each level of variation to the persistence of FGC
as defined here, i.e., as captured by respondents’ support for the continuance of FGC.
Estimating equation (2.1) allows one to recover the associated R2 measure, or coefficient of
determination. The R2 for equation (2.1)—which we label R21 for ease of exposition—tells
us how much of the variation in the dependent variable (here, support for FGC) is due
to the variables on the RHS of equation (2.1).
Note, however, that equation (2.1) does not include any geographic fixed effects.
Estimating equation (2.2)—which incorporates regional or district fixed effects—yields a
coefficient of determination R22, which necessarily has the property that R
2
2 > R
2
1 given
the nondecreasing nature of the coefficient of determination in the number of covariates
included in a regression. But R21 and R
2
2 can also be used to compute the contribution
of district- or regional-level factors to the persistence of FGC by computing:
10As part of the preliminary empirical work for this chapter, we estimated specifications controlling
for the number of sons and daughters each respondent had living with her, for the year she last gave
birth, for the number of children she lost while giving birth, and for the number of co-wives living with
her. None of those factors were found to be statistically significant determinants of support for FGC.
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R22 −R21
1−R21
(2.5)
That is, we compute how much of the variation not explained by the factors on the
RHS of equation (2.1) (i.e., the denominator) is explained by the inclusion of district or
regional fixed effects (i.e., the numerator). Similarly, estimating equation (2.3)—which
incorporates village fixed effects—yields a coefficient of determination R23, which is such
that R23 > R
2
2, and which can be used to compute the contribution of village-level factors
to the persistence of FGC by computing:
R23 −R22
1−R21
(2.6)
That is, we compute how much of the variation not explained by the factors on the
RHS of equation (2.1) is explained by the inclusion of village fixed effects. Similarly,
estimating equation (2.4)—which incorporates household fixed effects—yields a coefficient
of determination R24, which is such that R
2
4 > R
2
3, and which can be used to compute
the contribution of village-level factors to the persistence of FGC by computing:
R24 −R23
1−R21
(2.7)
That is, by computing how much of the variation not explained by the factors on the
RHS of equation (2.1) is explained by the inclusion of household fixed effects. Finally,
equation (2.4) can also be used to determine how much of the variation in the persistence
of FGC is due to unobserved individual-level factors by computing:
1−R24
1−R21
(2.8)
In other words, unexplained individual-level factor contribution is whatever variation
is left unexplained after estimating equation (2.4) (i.e., the numerator of equation (2.7))
as a percentage of whatever variation was unexplained after estimating equation (2.1) (i.e.,
the denominator of equations (2.5) to (2.8)). By definition, the sum of the contributions
of each level of variation—individual, household, village, and beyond—has to equal 1.
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2.3.2 Identification
We noted earlier that another contribution of ours is to estimate the association between
a woman reporting having undergone FGC and her support for the practice. While
this is true, our estimate of that association is not as cleanly identified as one would
like, which means that we cannot claim that the estimated relationships between a
respondent’s FGC status and our variables of interest are causal.
Indeed, there are three potential sources of statistical endogeneity to any empirical
application, all of which are sources of bias: (i) reverse causality, (ii) unobserved
heterogeneity, and (iii) measurement error. In this context, reverse causality is unlikely
to be an issue, first because most women have little to no say in whether they undergo
FGC given that the bulk of FGCs occur between the ages of four and eight (World
Health Organization, 2012). Second, even if a girl were given a choice in the matter, it
is unlikely that her future support for the practice would affect that early choice. This
concern is also alleviated by the fact that FGC almost always takes place before the girl
turns 15 and because our sample only includes women aged 15 to 49.
As is often the case in applied microeconomics, unobserved heterogeneity is per-
haps the most important source of statistical endogeneity in this context, and thus
the most important potential source of bias. That is, even though our use of dis-
trict–village–household fixed effects allows purging the error term of a great deal of its
correlation with the variables on the RHS of equation (2.4), it is not possible to control
for the unobserved heterogeneity between individuals in this context. Indeed, there are
many individual-level characteristics that are difficult to measure and which our data do
not include, such as a respondent’s bargaining power within her household, her degree
of risk aversion, her level of trust, and so on. Furthermore, it is likely that at least some
of those unobservable characteristics, which are in the error term in equation (2.4), are
correlated with some of the variables on the right-hand side of the same equation.
With regards to measurement error, a few studies question the reliability of self-
reported data on FGC, but the types of measurement error reported in those studies
do not threaten the validity of the estimates presented in this chapter. First, note that
throughout our analysis, we are careful to talk of the association between reporting
having undergone FGC and support for the practice rather than of the association
between having undergone FGC and support for the practice. To talk of the latter,
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FGC status would need to be physically verified by interviewers. Moreover, Elmusharaf
et al. (2006), report that there is measurement error in their Sudanese data due to their
respondents being confused about which type of FGC they have undergone, but not
about whether they have undergone FGC or not. Elmusharaf et al. (2006) note that
in their context, “there was complete agreement between reporting undergoing FGM
or not and what was found by inspection of genitals” (p. 126). Second, Jackson et al.
(2003) find that between 1995 and 2000, 13 percent of the women in their Ghanaian
longitudinal data went from reporting having undergone FGC in 1995 to reporting not
having undergone FGC in 2000—those respondents were the same in 1995 and in 2000.
In that context, however, the government began enforcing a law banning FGC sometime
between 1995 and 2000, and so the respondents in Jackson et al.’s study might have been
responding to a change in the legality of the practice. As such, because Ghana is one of
the 13 countries we retain for analysis and other included counties have implemented
similar bans, measurement error of this kind is a distinct possibility in this study.11
Another potential problem threatening the identification of the γ coefficients in
equations (2.1) to (2.4) is a violation of the stable unit treatment value assumption
(SUTVA; see Morgan and Winship, 2007), which requires that whether one unit is treated
should have no impact on another unit’s outcome. In our application, the SUTVA entails
that whether a woman reports having undergone FGC or not has no impact on whether
another woman is in support of the continuance of the practice, i.e., that there are no
spillovers between respondents. This is highly unlikely to hold in this context; one can
think of situations where a woman who regrets having undergone FGC discusses it with
the other women in her household and changes their view of the practice. Indeed, even
with household fixed effects, which control for all the factors common to women in the
same household, one cannot rule out that one respondent’s experience (or lack thereof)
of FGC has no impact on another woman’s support for the practice.12
11As per UNICEF (2013), the following countries have bans on FGC, with the year of adoption of the
ban in parentheses: Benin (2003), Burkina Faso (1996), Coˆte d’Ivoire (1998), Ghana (1965, amended
2007), Guinea (1965, amended 2000), Guinea-Bissau (2011), Niger (2003), Nigeria (1999–2006), Senegal
(1999), Togo (1998). The presence of those bans does not change the empirical results in tables 2.3 to
2.15 below, however, because all respondents in a given country-year where the practice is banned face
the same ban, and those bans only vary from country-year to country-year.
12Note that this is distinct from confirmation bias, the phenomenon whereby a woman who reports
having undergone FGC might be more likely to be in favor of it, and vice versa. Our estimate of
FGC persistence includes the effect of confirmation bias. This does not threaten identification, because
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How could one obtain a causal or cleanly identified estimate of γ? Because the
gold standard provided by a randomized controlled trial would raise serious ethical
questions, one needs to think about alternative methods aimed at teasing out causation
from correlation. The next-best alternative might be a difference-in-difference design
that would survey respondents before and after they undergo FGC and look at whether
their views on the practice change as a result of having undergone FGC. But given
that the bulk of FGCs occur before the age of 15 (indeed, many occur between the
ages of 4 and 8; see World Health Organization (2012), the immaturity of respondents
would likely make it difficult to get reliable answers. Similar issues would arise with
longitudinal data, which would follow respondents over several years and exploit the
variation in respondents’ own-FGC status and in their views on the practice of FGC, with
the additional problem that one might not observe enough variation in the dependent
variables and in the outcome of interest.
Another alternative would be to use a quasi-experimental research design that would
rely on an instrumental variable, i.e., a variable that is correlated with whether a woman
has undergone FGC, but which only affects her support for the practice through her own
FGC status. Such a variable, however, might be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to
come by.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Cross Tabulations
For each of the 38 country-years we retain for analysis, table 2.2 presents a cross-tabulation
of the dependent variable and the variable interest, i.e., whether the respondent would
like FGC to continue and whether the respondent reports having undergone FGC, for
women aged 15 to 49 in West Africa. As alluded to in the tables of descriptive statistics,
in all countries except The Gambia, Guinea, Mali, and Sierra Leone, the proportion of
women aged 15 to 49 who say they do not support the continuance of FGC is greater
than the proportion of women aged 15 to 49 who say they support the continuance of the
practice. This is true for all years of data collection. Similarly, the proportion of women
confirmation bias can be one reason among many why a respondent supports FGC or not. Thus, whereas
a violation of SUTVA threatens identification, confirmation bias does not.
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aged 15 to 49 who report not having undergone FGC exceeds the number of women
aged 15 to 49 who report having undergone FGC in all but 5 out of 13 countries. Those
countries are Burkina Faso, The Gambia, Guinea, Mali, and Sierra Leone. This is true
for all years of data collection. Encouragingly for the opponents of FGC, the number
of women aged 15 to 49 who (i) report having undergone FGC but (ii) are against the
continuance of the practice exceeds the number of women aged 15 to 49 who (i) report
not having undergone FGC but (ii) are in favor of the continuance of the practice in
each of the countries and years retained for analysis, except in Nigeria in 1998.
Table 2.2: Cross tabulations of the dependent variable with the variable of interest
Respondent Underwent FGC: No No Yes Yes
Respondent Would Like FGC to Continue: No Yes No Yes
Country–Year % % % %
Benin 2001 73.71 1.70 20.84 3.75
Benin 2006 78.28 0.76 20.20 0.76
Benin 2011 86.21 1.72 11.44 0.63
Burkina Faso 1998 14.46 1.18 62.82 21.54
Burkina Faso 2003 22.28 1.08 60.89 15.75
Burkina Faso 2006 23.36 1.39 63.79 11.46
Burkina Faso 2010 23.79 0.41 67.72 8.08
Coˆte d’Ivoire 1998 52.44 2.50 18.56 26.50
Coˆte d’Ivoire 2006 52.82 1.50 19.74 25.94
Coˆte d’Ivoire 2011 54.93 1.48 29.81 13.78
Gambia 2005 17.53 0.64 6.25 75.58
Gambia 2010 19.29 1.38 11.90 67.43
Ghana 2006 87.39 1.86 9.60 1.15
Ghana 2011 76.87 1.53 19.45 2.15
Guinea 1999 0.68 0.35 23.95 75.02
Guinea 2005 1.28 1.73 19.47 77.52
Guinea 2012 1.43 0.59 20.65 77.33
Guinea Bissau 2006 49.57 1.49 18.83 30.11
Mali 1995 7.10 0.83 10.51 81.56
Mali 2001 6.70 0.96 8.77 83.57
Mali 2006 8.45 1.71 11.67 78.17
Mali 2012 5.10 1.22 15.07 78.61
Niger 1998 62.76 21.12 4.18 11.94
Continued on next page
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Table 2.2 (continued)
Respondent Underwent FGC: No No Yes Yes
Respondent Would Like FGC to Continue: No Yes No Yes
Country Year % % % %
Niger 2006 92.57 1.76 4.58 1.09
Niger 2012 92.80 2.82 3.20 1.18
Nigeria 1999 62.09 2.67 14.44 20.80
Nigeria 2003 50.99 5.12 21.59 22.30
Nigeria 2007 53.45 2.88 25.35 18.32
Nigeria 2008 51.56 2.69 24.51 21.24
Nigeria 2011 47.99 3.04 28.55 20.42
Nigeria 2013 52.93 7.66 22.58 16.83
Senegal 2005 59.74 1.63 15.55 23.08
Senegal 2010 58.62 1.69 16.57 23.12
Sierra Leone 2005 2.54 1.66 10.27 85.53
Sierra Leone 2008 6.40 2.31 22.54 68.75
Sierra Leone 2010 4.02 1.31 19.72 74.95
Togo 2006 85.95 1.94 10.68 1.43
Togo 2010 89.07 1.22 8.35 1.36
2.4.2 Linear Probability Models
Tables 2.3 to 2.15 present, in alphabetical order of countries for the most recent available
year, estimation results for the LPMs in equations (2.1) to (2.4) in which a respondent’s
response to the question regarding her support for the continuance of the practice
is regressed on whether she reports having undergone FGC herself, individual-level
covariates, and household-level covariates. Ethnicity, religion, and interviewer fixed
effects are included throughout all regressions. Our results do not show estimated
coefficients for these variables. These coefficients are omitted in order to economize on
space and, more importantly, because the estimated coefficients are not particularly
meaningful since the coefficients only allow the reader to make comparisons to the
omitted category. Interested readers should refer to table 8 of the online appendix for
descriptive statistics on the prevalence of FGC and support for the practice among
women aged 15 to 49 that ascribe to each religion. Tables 1a to 1y of the online appendix
present the results for the LPMs in equations (2.1) to (2.4) for all earlier available years
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for each country retained for the analysis.
Consistent with the methodology outlined in section 2.3.1, columns 1 to 4 of each
of tables 2.3 to 2.15 (shown at the end of the text of this chapter) include increasingly
refined layers of fixed effects, from no geographic fixed effects in column 1 to region,
village, and household fixed effects in columns 2, 3, and 4, respectively (ethnicity, religion,
and interviewer fixed effects are included in all specifications).
Given the number of countries retained for analysis, we do not discuss individual
country results, focusing instead on a summary of the results for the most recent year
available for each country. In what follows, we focus on our most complete specifications
(i.e., column 4 of tables 2.3 to 2.15 as well as the tables of early country-years which are
not shown) and on the estimated coefficient for whether a respondent reports having
undergone FGC, which is our variable of interest. Looking at the first line of each
table, which presents the estimated coefficient on whether a respondent reports having
undergone FGC, our results suggest that women aged 15 to 49 who report having
undergone FGC are on average 16 percentage points more likely to be in favor of the
practice in West Africa once household fixed effects (under which fixed effects for village,
region, and beyond are subsumed) are included, but this average masks a considerable
amount of heterogeneity given that it is the result of averaging over our estimates of
that increase in likelihood over the 38 country-year data sets we use in this chapter.
At one extreme of the distribution, there are countries where there is little to no
relationship between having undergone FGC and being in favor of the practice for
women aged 15 to 49. In Benin in 2011, for example, the estimated coefficient on
whether a woman reports having undergone FGC in column 4 is neither economically nor
statistically significant, which suggests that in this country-year for the women included
in our data, a woman’s own reported FGC status has no relationship with whether she
supports the continuance of the practice. Similarly, in Niger in 2012, and in Togo in
2010, that coefficient is not statistically significant, and the point estimate is less than
0.05. These coefficients are also statistically insignificant in all earlier available years of
data from Niger and Togo.
At the other extreme of the distribution, there are countries in which, for women aged
15 to 49, a woman’s reported FGC status has a very strong association with whether she
supports the practice. In The Gambia in 2010, the estimated coefficient on whether a
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woman aged 15 to 49 reports having undergone FGC is equal to 0.502 and is significant
at the 1 percent level. Similarly, in Mali in 2012, the estimated coefficient on whether a
woman aged 15 to 49 reports having undergone FGC is equal to 0.352 and is significant
at the 1 percent level. This suggests that in The Gambia in 2010 and in Mali in 2012, a
woman aged 15 to 49 who reports having undergone FGC was respectively 50 and 35
percentage points more likely to support the practice. The estimated coefficients and
significance levels are very similar in earlier rounds of data collection for The Gambia
and Mali.13
In an alternative specification of our main regression results, we included all variables
listed above as well as (i) gender of the household head, and (ii) age of the respondent’s
partner. These variables are included to coarsely proxy for bargaining power of the
woman in decisions related to FGC, such as whether her daughters will be cut. Table 5a to
5al of the online appendix display the regression results for this alternative specification.
The results of this alternative specification are almost identical to the regression results
presented here.
Turning to the respective contribution of each level of variation (i.e., individual,
household, village, and beyond), we use the method outlined in equations (2.5) to (2.8)
to do so for each country-year on the basis of our core specifications. Table 3 in the
online appendix presents those contributions, and figure 2.1 below summarizes those
results. What is immediately striking about figure 2.1 is how, in almost all country-years,
the bulk of the variation in support for FGC among women aged 15 to 49 can be ascribed
to household-level factors. The lone exception to this is Mali in 2001 which, given that
Mali in 1995 and Mali in 2006 look very similar, is likely the result of sampling error. In
addition, in all but two cases (i.e., Niger in 2012 and Nigeria in 2011), individual- and
household- level factors explain over 80 percent of the variation in support for FGC.
2.4.3 Dynamics in the Persistence of FGC
The findings in tables 2.3 to 2.15 and in figure 2.1 show the sources of variation in
support for the continuance of FGC among women aged 15 to 49 across the 13 countries
retained for analysis. The information contained in those tables and in that figure can
13Except for Mali in 2006, for which the estimated coefficient is substantially smaller (0.123) and
statistically insignificant.
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Figure 2.1: Percentage of Contribution of Each Level of Variation to the Persistence of FGC in West Africa
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be used to provide a discussion, albeit a necessarily speculative one, of the potential
dynamics of FGC persistence. That is, for all 38 country-years in our sample, one can
plot the percentage contribution of each level of variation against the extent of reported
FGC and look at whether there seems to be any relationship between the proportion of
women aged 15 to 49 who report having undergone FGC and what level of variation
drives support for the continuance of the practice among these same women.
Figures 2.2 a to c plot the extent of reported FGC on the x-axis and how much of the
variation in support for the continuance of FGC comes from the individual, household,
and village levels, respectively, on the y-axis. A round marker indicates that there is
no FGC ban in place at the time of data collection in that country while an x marker
indicates that there was a ban on FGC at the time of data collection in the given country.
The regressions used to obtain the fitted linear functions in each one of figures 2.2 a to c
can be found in appendix table A.1.14 Again, we wish to reiterate that given the small
sample of 38 country-year observations, this discussion is meant to be speculative. With
that said, the results in figures 2.2 a to c suggest that
1. The greater the prevalence of reported FGC among women aged 15 to 49 in a society,
the more support for the continuance of the practice is driven by individual-level
factors (figure 2.2 a).
2. Conversely, the greater the prevalence of reported FGC among women aged 15 to
49 in a society, the less support for the continuance of the practice is driven by
household-level factors (figure 2.2 b).
3. Likewise, the greater the prevalence of reported FGC among women aged 15 to
49 in a society, the less support for the continuance of the practice is driven by
village-level factors (figure 2.2 c).
4. Generally speaking, a 10 percent increase in the prevalence of FGC among women
aged 15 to 49 is associated with about (i) a 2 percent increase in the unobserved
individual-level contribution to variation in support for FGC, (ii) a 1 percent
decrease in the household-level contribution to variation in support for FGC, and
14In preliminary empirical work, we also investigated potential nonlinear dynamics by estimating
quadratic specifications of the regressions in appendix table A.1, but we found that the quadratic terms
were never statistically significant.
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(iii) a 0.5 percent decrease in the village-level contribution to variation in support
for FGC.
5. In the aggregate, as the practice of FGC becomes less prevalent among women
aged 15 to 49, support for the practice appears to increasingly become the result
of factors beyond the individual (i.e., household and village).
Figure 2.2: Relationship between the proportion of women who report having undergone
FGC and the proportion of variation in support from FGC that is due to: individual-level
factors (panel a); household-level factors (panel b); and village-level factors (panel c).
Figure 2.2 b suggests that even with a sharp decrease in FGC prevalence, the bulk
of FGC persistence would still come from household-level factors. This is in contrast
to the tipping point and informational cascade models (Schelling, 1978; Bikhchandani
et al., 1992, 1998) discussed in the introduction, wherein the decision to abandon a social
norm such as FGC should be entirely individual in places where the practice is highly
pervasive.
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2.4.4 Limitations
We have discussed the limitations of our identification strategy at length in section
2.3. In addition to those limitations, we note the following limitations of this study.
First, we cannot distinguish between the various types of FGC the women in our sample
report to have undergone or between the types of FGC they support. This matters
because one can be in support of one type of FGC without necessarily being in support
of another type. Second, recall that the data we use only sampled women between the
ages of 15 and 49, which means that we cannot possibly capture what women younger
than 15 or older than 49 think. This is important to consider because elderly women
are often the ones performing FGC (Morrone et al., 2002), and so they may have an
important influence in the persistence of the practice—as one of our reviewers noted,
women aged 15 to 49 are an important piece of the puzzle—but they are only one piece
of it. Our findings, however, indicate that generally, either age has no impact on support
for FGC or that support for FGC is decreasing in the age of respondents up to age 49.
Additionally, we must remain agnostic about what men think about FGC. Sampling
men as well as women would allow studying intrahousehold decision processes regarding
FGC (Alderman et al., 1995; Doss, 1996) as well as the marriage market value of FGC
(Wagner, 2015).
Third, relative to other studies, we must remain agnostic about the three theories that
have been developed to account for the persistence of FGC. The first of those theories,
convention theory, states that FGC persists as a social norm (Easton et al., 2003; Hayford,
2005; Lightfoot-Klein, 1989; Mackie, 1996; Shell-Duncan and Hernlund, 2006). The
second theory, feminist theory, posits that as women’s rights expand, support for FGC
should decrease (Easton et al., 2003; El Dawla, 1999; Finke, 2006; Yount, Kathryn, 2002).
The third theory, modernization theory, states that as a society modernizes, support
for FGC should wane (Easton et al., 2003; Williams and Sobieszczy, 1997). Fourth,
and finally, regarding external validity, though our sample allows drawing inference
about the persistence of FGC among all women aged 15 to 49 in 13 out of 15 West
African countries, it is unclear whether our results apply to other countries where FGC
is practiced—or even to West African women younger than 15 or older than 49.
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2.5 Summary and Conclusions
We have investigated the practice of FGC, which has been declining in some countries
but persists in others. Specifically, using household survey data covering over 300,000
women aged 15 to 49 in 38 country-year observations in West Africa, we have done two
things. First, we have studied the relationship between a woman’s own reported FGC
status—whether she reports having undergone FGC—and her support for the practice,
which we adopt as our definition of FGC persistence. Second, we have quantified the
contribution of each level of variation—individual, household, village, and beyond—in
explaining support for the continuance of FGC. We find that much of the variation in a
woman’s support for FGC can be attributed to individual- and household-level factors
rather than to village-level factors or to factors beyond the village level.
Finally, we find that reporting having undergone FGC is associated with a 16
percentage point increase in the likelihood that a woman will be in favor of the continuance
of the practice in West Africa. This figure is found by averaging over our estimates from
the 38 country-year datasets we use in this chapter of the increase in the likelihood that
one supports FGC if she reports that she has undergone FGC.
The main strength of this study lies in the design of the surveys used for analysis,
which allows exploiting the within-household variation in respondents’ support for the
practice, which allows determining how much each level of variation contributes to the
persistence of FGC. Additionally, our findings are nationally representative for women
aged 15 to 49 in for 38 country-year observations spanning the period 1995 to 2013 in 13
out of 15 West African countries.
That said, the countries in our sample are only a fraction of the many countries
where the practice of FGC remains widespread, which points to the need for studies
such as this one in other regions. Cases of FGC have also been reported in the Central
African Republic, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Liberia, Malaysia,
Oman, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen,
and in those countries, the sources of variation in support for the practice might be
different than in West Africa. In addition, to better understand the mechanisms through
which FGC persists, there is a need for systematic investigations of the causal pathways
behind FGC persistence. Likewise, there is a need for a better understanding of the
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consequences of FGC regarding educational, health, and labor-market outcomes for the
women who undergo FGC.
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Table 2.3: LPM estimation results for whether respondents think FGC should con-
tinue—Benin 2011
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: = 1 if respondent thinks FGC should continue, = 0 otherwise.
Underwent FGC 0.056*** 0.058*** 0.054*** 0.006
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.016)
Age 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
Age squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Primary education -0.006 -0.006* -0.006 -0.014
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.021)
Secondary education 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.016)
Higher education 0.010 0.007 0.010 0.010
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.031)
Married -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.016)
Cohabitating 0.017* 0.016* 0.016 0.007
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.032)
Widowed 0.014 0.013 0.021 0.052
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.059)
Divorced 0.019 0.018 0.012 0.005
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017)
Separated -0.005 -0.006 -0.002 -0.025
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.039)
Television -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Radio -0.004 -0.004 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Electricity 0.004 0.004 0.008*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Urban household -0.001 -0.001
(0.004) (0.004)
Constant -0.030 -0.026 0.011 0.094
(0.020) (0.030) (0.029) (0.142)
Observations 10,477 10,477 10,477 10,477
R-squared 0.402 0.405 0.477 0.915
Continued on next page]
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Table 2.3 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: = 1 if respondent thinks FGC should continue, = 0 otherwise.
Interviewer fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnicity fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Religion fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Village fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Household fixed effects No No No Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.4: LPM estimation results for whether respondents think FGC should con-
tinue—Burkina Faso 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: = 1 if respondent thinks FGC should continue, = 0 otherwise.
Underwent FGC 0.079*** 0.080*** 0.076*** 0.036*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.019)
Age -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.010**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
Age squared 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Primary education -0.007 -0.008 -0.005 -0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.019)
Secondary education -0.032*** -0.033*** -0.030*** -0.021
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.021)
Higher education -0.043*** -0.050*** -0.051*** -0.026
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.035)
Married 0.000 0.000 -0.005 0.013
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.025)
Cohabitating 0.004 0.003 -0.008 -0.015
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.035)
Widowed -0.024* -0.025* -0.030** 0.013
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.037)
Divorced 0.015 0.013 0.025 -0.043
(0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.054)
Continued on next page]
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Table 2.4 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: = 1 if respondent thinks FGC should continue, = 0 otherwise.
Separated -0.005 -0.007 -0.009 -0.031
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.047)
Television -0.003 -0.005 -0.001
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Radio -0.010* -0.009 -0.010
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Electricity -0.008 -0.009 -0.010
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Urban household -0.009 -0.012*
(0.007) (0.007)
Constant 0.092** 0.098* 0.501*** 0.198
(0.046) (0.055) (0.079) (0.138)
Observations 16,595 16,595 16,595 16,595
R-squared 0.094 0.097 0.177 0.773
Interviewer fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnicity fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Religion fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Village fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Household fixed effects No No No Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.5: LPM estimation results for whether respondents think FGC should con-
tinue—Coˆte d’Ivoire 2011
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: = 1 if respondent thinks FGC should continue, = 0 otherwise.
Underwent FGC 0.215*** 0.202*** 0.175*** 0.110**
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.043)
Age -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.012
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.012)
Age squared 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000
Continued on next page]
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Table 2.5 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: = 1 if respondent thinks FGC should continue, = 0 otherwise.
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Primary education -0.050*** -0.051*** -0.042*** -0.004
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.027)
Secondary education -0.065*** -0.063*** -0.067*** -0.030
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.029)
Higher education -0.032* -0.032* -0.053*** -0.022
(0.018) (0.019) (0.013) (0.035)
Married 0.044*** 0.042*** 0.031** 0.055
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.042)
Cohabitating 0.032** 0.036** 0.030** 0.043
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.042)
Widowed 0.028 0.032 0.028 0.081
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.065)
Divorced 0.016 0.024 0.007 0.087
(0.034) (0.034) (0.038) (0.097)
Separated 0.018 0.020 0.012 0.032
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.041)
Television -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.042***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Radio 0.009 0.011 0.018*
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Electricity -0.028 -0.027 -0.013
(0.018) (0.017) (0.022)
Urban household -0.035** -0.028*
(0.016) (0.015)
Constant 0.330*** 0.485*** 0.306*** 0.629*
(0.082) (0.095) (0.101) (0.364)
Observations 8,731 8,731 8,731 8,731
R-squared 0.279 0.295 0.372 0.847
Interviewer fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnicity fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Religion fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Village fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Household fixed effects No No No Yes
Continued on next page]
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Table 2.5 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: = 1 if respondent thinks FGC should continue, = 0 otherwise.
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.6: LPM estimation results for whether respondents think FGC should con-
tinue—The Gambia 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: = 1 if respondent thinks FGC should continue, = 0 otherwise.
Underwent FGC 0.676*** 0.670*** 0.677*** 0.502***
(0.011) (0.018) (0.018) (0.053)
Age -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Age squared 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Primary education -0.069** 0.004 -0.009
(0.034) (0.042) (0.036)
Secondary education -0.134*** -0.056 -0.065*
(0.034) (0.041) (0.035)
Higher education -0.217*** -0.135** -0.153**
(0.049) (0.053) (0.070)
Non-traditional education -0.111** 0.000 -0.055
(0.047) (0.000) (0.088)
Madrassa primary education -0.024 0.031 -0.002
(0.036) (0.043) (0.037)
Madrassa secondary education 0.000 0.073 0.000
(0.000) (0.050) (0.000)
Married 0.012 0.016 0.013
(0.012) (0.013) (0.023)
Cohabitating -0.322** -0.318* -0.004
(0.137) (0.168) (0.023)
Widowed 0.022 0.018 0.007
(0.031) (0.030) (0.044)
Divorced -0.017 -0.021 -0.035
(0.030) (0.029) (0.054)
Continued on next page]
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Table 2.6 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: = 1 if respondent thinks FGC should continue, = 0 otherwise.
Separated 0.010 0.021 0.067
(0.058) (0.058) (0.175)
Television 0.016* 0.012 0.008
(0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
Radio -0.019** -0.012 -0.015
(0.009) (0.013) (0.013)
Electricity -0.031*** -0.016 -0.014
(0.010) (0.013) (0.014)
Urban household 0.022*** 0.087***
(0.009) (0.031)
Constant 0.319*** 0.234*** 0.168 -0.221
(0.046) (0.073) (0.107) (0.183)
Observations 10,919 13,101 13,101 13,101
R-squared 0.522 0.535 0.575 0.805
Interviewer fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnicity fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Religion fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Village fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Household fixed effects No No No Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.7: LPM estimation results for whether respondents think FGC should con-
tinue—Ghana 2011
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: = 1 if respondent thinks FGC should continue, = 0 otherwise.
Underwent FGC 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.060** 0.118
(0.023) (0.023) (0.029) (0.153)
Age -0.015** -0.015** -0.012 -0.048
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.077)
Age squared 0.000* 0.000* 0.000 0.001
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Table 2.7 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: = 1 if respondent thinks FGC should continue, = 0 otherwise.
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Primary education 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.038* 0.018
(0.014) (0.014) (0.022) (0.313)
Secondary education 0.019 0.019 0.025 -0.073
(0.012) (0.012) (0.020) (0.251)
Vocational training 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tertiary education 0.015 0.012 0.022 -0.047
(0.022) (0.022) (0.028) (0.461)
Married 0.031 0.028 0.015 0.184
(0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.397)
Cohabitating 0.029 0.026 0.026 0.208
(0.028) (0.028) (0.031) (0.440)
Widowed 0.024 0.023 0.028 -0.029
(0.037) (0.037) (0.045) (1.102)
Divorced 0.012 0.013 0.008 0.174
(0.028) (0.029) (0.031) (0.334)
Separated -0.006 -0.010 -0.002 0.186
(0.036) (0.036) (0.038) (0.607)
Television 0.031 0.031 0.047
(0.025) (0.025) (0.034)
Radio -0.007 -0.006 -0.014
(0.012) (0.012) (0.015)
Electricity -0.020 -0.020 -0.013
(0.019) (0.019) (0.022)
Urban household -0.022 -0.020
(0.015) (0.015)
Constant 0.218* 0.248* 0.185 0.572
(0.117) (0.129) (0.152) (1.222)
Observations 4,181 4,181 4,181 4,181
R-squared 0.081 0.084 0.259 0.923
Interviewer fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnicity fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Religion fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
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Table 2.7 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: = 1 if respondent thinks FGC should continue, = 0 otherwise.
Village fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Household fixed effects No No No Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.8: LPM estimation results for whether respondents think FGC should con-
tinue—Guinea 2012
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: = 1 if respondent thinks FGC should continue, = 0 otherwise.
Underwent FGC 0.313*** 0.312*** 0.302*** 0.260**
(0.041) (0.042) (0.040) (0.123)
Age -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 0.007
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.011)
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Primary education -0.023 -0.023 -0.021 -0.009
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.050)
Secondary education -0.172*** -0.171*** -0.169*** -0.121***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.045)
Higher education -0.349*** -0.353*** -0.347*** -0.284***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.037) (0.102)
Married 0.079*** 0.081*** 0.073*** 0.067
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.049)
Cohabitating 0.034 0.023 0.011 0.086
(0.054) (0.053) (0.059) (0.159)
Widowed 0.048 0.051 0.046 -0.007
(0.048) (0.047) (0.048) (0.109)
Divorced -0.043 -0.044 -0.052 -0.016
(0.048) (0.047) (0.048) (0.115)
Separated 0.125** 0.111* 0.122** 0.072
(0.059) (0.058) (0.059) (0.185)
Television -0.006 -0.010 0.003
(0.026) (0.025) (0.028)
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Table 2.8 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: = 1 if respondent thinks FGC should continue, = 0 otherwise.
Radio -0.027** -0.021* -0.014
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Electricity -0.042 -0.061** -0.057
(0.031) (0.030) (0.037)
Urban household -0.073*** -0.086***
(0.021) (0.022)
Constant 0.764*** 0.834*** 0.361** 0.213
(0.105) (0.108) (0.174) (0.464)
Observations 8,607 8,607 8,607 8,607
R-squared 0.190 0.198 0.256 0.762
Interviewer fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnicity fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Religion fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Village fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Household fixed effects No No No Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.9: LPM estimation results for whether respondents think FGC should con-
tinue—Guinea Bissau 2006
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: = 1 if respondent thinks FGC should continue, = 0 otherwise.
Underwent FGC 0.269*** 0.269*** 0.242*** 0.083
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.065)
Age -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.000
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010)
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Primary education -0.147** -0.147** 0.058 -0.006
(0.069) (0.069) (0.072) (0.041)
Secondary education -0.195*** -0.195*** 0.008 -0.028
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Table 2.9 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: = 1 if respondent thinks FGC should continue, = 0 otherwise.
(0.069) (0.069) (0.073) (0.031)
Higher education -0.195* -0.194* 0.000 0.000
(0.100) (0.100) (0.000) (0.000)
Non-standard education 0.000 0.000 0.160 -0.040
(0.000) (0.000) (0.103) (0.083)
Married 0.055*** 0.054** 0.041* 0.023
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.034)
Cohabitating -0.014 -0.016 -0.022 -0.054
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.063)
Widowed 0.068 0.067 0.073* 0.093
(0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.094)
Divorced -0.031 -0.033 -0.038 -0.086
(0.026) (0.026) (0.030) (0.091)
Television -0.057** -0.057** -0.045*
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025)
Radio 0.017 0.018 0.019
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017)
Electricity 0.004 0.003 0.014
(0.022) (0.022) (0.021)
Urban household -0.127*** -0.126***
(0.018) (0.018)
Constant 0.858*** 0.869*** 0.859*** 1.027***
(0.124) (0.125) (0.158) (0.284)
Observations 6,431 6,431 6,431 6,431
R-squared 0.484 0.485 0.544 0.867
Interviewer fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnicity fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Religion fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Village fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Household fixed effects No No No Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.10: LPM estimation results for whether respondents think FGC should con-
tinue—Mali 2012
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: = 1 if respondent thinks FGC should continue, = 0 otherwise.
Underwent FGC 0.551*** 0.549*** 0.494*** 0.352***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.121)
Age -0.008** -0.007** -0.008** -0.006
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.016)
Age squared 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Primary education -0.050*** -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.052
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.069)
Secondary education -0.104*** -0.104*** -0.102*** -0.080
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.071)
Higher education -0.253*** -0.259*** -0.245*** -0.272*
(0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.143)
Married 0.038** 0.038** 0.044** 0.025
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.071)
Cohabitating 0.018 0.018 0.029 0.065
(0.030) (0.030) (0.032) (0.123)
Widowed 0.025 0.023 0.043 0.071
(0.045) (0.046) (0.048) (0.173)
Divorced -0.024 -0.022 0.010 0.064
(0.058) (0.057) (0.059) (0.287)
Separated 0.027 0.029 0.037 0.087
(0.054) (0.053) (0.052) (0.161)
Television -0.038*** -0.039*** -0.025**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Radio 0.017* 0.018* 0.020**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Electricity 0.027* 0.022 0.027*
(0.016) (0.015) (0.014)
Urban household 0.027 0.007
(0.018) (0.019)
Constant -0.120 -0.130 0.148 0.397
(0.127) (0.184) (0.183) (0.462)
Observations 9,202 9,202 9,202 9,202
R-squared 0.274 0.276 0.345 0.859
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Table 2.10 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: = 1 if respondent thinks FGC should continue, = 0 otherwise.
Interviewer fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnicity fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Religion fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Village fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Household fixed effects No No No Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.11: LPM estimation results for whether respondents think FGC should con-
tinue—Niger 2012
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: = 1 if respondent thinks FGC should continue, = 0 otherwise.
Underwent FGC 0.218*** 0.223*** 0.198*** 0.021
(0.046) (0.044) (0.051) (0.116)
Age -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Primary education -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.012
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.017)
Secondary education -0.009** -0.013*** -0.007 -0.012
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.018)
Higher education -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.017** -0.016
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.020)
Married 0.010* 0.008 0.010 0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.022)
Cohabitating 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003
(0.007) (0.008) (0.013) (0.011)
Widowed 0.033 0.030 0.032 -0.004
(0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.030)
Divorced 0.027* 0.024 0.015 -0.000
(0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.026)
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Table 2.11 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: = 1 if respondent thinks FGC should continue, = 0 otherwise.
Separated 0.005 0.001 -0.002 0.010
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.020)
Television 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Radio 0.000 -0.000 -0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Electricity -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.014**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Urban household -0.019*** -0.024***
(0.007) (0.008)
Constant 0.084*** 0.086** 0.016 0.053
(0.029) (0.034) (0.028) (0.060)
Observations 4,474 4,474 4,474 4,474
R-squared 0.165 0.180 0.373 0.910
Interviewer fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnicity fixed effects No No No No
Religion fixed effects No No No No
Region fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Village fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Household fixed effects No No No Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.12: LPM estimation results for whether respondents think FGC should con-
tinue—Nigeria 2013
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: = 1 if respondent thinks FGC should continue, = 0 otherwise.
Underwent FGC 0.292*** 0.291*** 0.253*** 0.154***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.049)
Age -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.009)
Age squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
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Table 2.12 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: = 1 if respondent thinks FGC should continue, = 0 otherwise.
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Primary education -0.015 -0.017 -0.010 -0.038
(0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.048)
Secondary education -0.030** -0.031** -0.022* -0.031
(0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.054)
Higher education -0.083*** -0.084*** -0.064*** -0.107
(0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.067)
Married -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 0.022
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.045)
Cohabitating -0.003 -0.005 -0.003 -0.029
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.097)
Widowed 0.005 0.006 0.003 -0.009
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.083)
Divorced 0.002 0.003 -0.004 -0.035
(0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.099)
Separated -0.004 -0.004 -0.021 0.029
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.115)
Television -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.014**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Radio -0.013* -0.012* -0.013
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Electricity -0.009 -0.007 0.010
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013)
Urban household -0.005 -0.004
(0.011) (0.011)
Constant 0.283*** 0.351*** 0.398** -0.133
(0.064) (0.076) (0.180) (0.229)
Observations 21,336 21,336 21,336 21,336
R-squared 0.339 0.339 0.415 0.906
Interviewer fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnicity fixed effects No No No No
Religion fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Village fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Household fixed effects No No No Yes
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Table 2.12 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: = 1 if respondent thinks FGC should continue, = 0 otherwise.
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.13: LPM estimation results for whether respondents think FGC should con-
tinue—Senegal 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: = 1 if respondent thinks FGC should continue, = 0 otherwise.
Underwent FGC 0.411*** 0.392*** 0.326*** 0.228***
(0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.048)
Age -0.009** -0.010** -0.009** -0.009
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007)
Age squared 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Primary education -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.043*** -0.050**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.021)
Secondary education -0.134*** -0.131*** -0.122*** -0.115***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.031)
Higher education -0.068 -0.061 -0.069 -0.064
(0.051) (0.049) (0.049) (0.067)
Married 0.023 0.031** 0.031** 0.036**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.017)
Cohabitating -0.116** -0.111** -0.088** -0.005
(0.051) (0.052) (0.042) (0.090)
Widowed -0.032 -0.039 -0.033 0.047
(0.045) (0.043) (0.045) (0.065)
Divorced -0.002 0.005 0.009 0.027
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.046)
Separated -0.032 -0.024 -0.016 0.050
(0.056) (0.056) (0.054) (0.101)
Television -0.006 -0.012 0.004
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
Radio 0.019 0.021 0.012
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
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Table 2.13 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: = 1 if respondent thinks FGC should continue, = 0 otherwise.
Electricity -0.004 -0.015 -0.009
(0.018) (0.018) (0.017)
Urban household -0.047*** -0.039**
(0.018) (0.018)
Constant 0.237*** 0.634*** 0.589*** 0.254
(0.082) (0.183) (0.210) (0.177)
Observations 13,160 13,160 13,160 13,160
R-squared 0.404 0.422 0.481 0.768
Interviewer fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnicity fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Religion fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Village fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Household fixed effects No No No Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.14: LPM estimation results for whether respondents think FGC should con-
tinue—Sierra Leone 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: = 1 if respondent thinks FGC should continue, = 0 otherwise.
Underwent FGC 0.349*** 0.350*** 0.347*** 0.402
(0.026) (0.026) (0.029) (0.464)
Age -0.004 -0.004 -0.006 -0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.033)
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Primary education -0.039 -0.040 -0.020 -0.077
(0.025) (0.025) (0.029) (0.133)
Secondary education -0.173*** -0.172*** -0.162*** -0.172
(0.031) (0.031) (0.034) (0.279)
Higher education -0.294*** -0.291*** -0.287*** -0.180
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Table 2.14 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: = 1 if respondent thinks FGC should continue, = 0 otherwise.
(0.068) (0.067) (0.078) (0.405)
Married -0.001 -0.001 -0.015 -0.064
(0.027) (0.027) (0.030) (0.261)
Cohabitating 0.006 0.005 0.003 -0.196
(0.046) (0.045) (0.054) (0.441)
Widowed -0.004 -0.002 0.008 -0.093
(0.043) (0.043) (0.047) (0.360)
Divorced 0.087 0.074 -0.022 0.159
(0.094) (0.090) (0.073) (0.499)
Separated -0.001 -0.004 -0.017 -0.020
(0.037) (0.037) (0.039) (0.266)
Television -0.016 -0.014 -0.005
(0.034) (0.034) (0.035)
Radio -0.053*** -0.053*** -0.036***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
Electricity -0.018 -0.021 -0.010
(0.032) (0.032) (0.037)
Urban household -0.024 -0.020
(0.020) (0.021)
Constant 0.620*** 0.400*** 0.585*** 0.358
(0.156) (0.131) (0.159) (0.695)
Observations 7,232 7,232 7,232 7,232
R-squared 0.325 0.328 0.393 0.925
Interviewer fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnicity fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Religion fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Village fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Household fixed effects No No No Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.15: LPM estimation results for whether respondents think FGC should con-
tinue—Togo 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: = 1 if respondent thinks FGC should continue, = 0 otherwise.
Underwent FGC 0.110*** 0.109*** 0.087*** 0.032
(0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.041)
Age -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 -0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008)
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Primary education -0.003 -0.003 0.003 0.002
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.023)
Secondary education (Colle´ge) -0.008 -0.009 -0.003 0.012
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.013)
Higher education (Lyce´e) -0.018 -0.020* -0.010 0.006
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.037)
Married 0.017 0.018 0.010 -0.001
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.039)
Cohabitating 0.015 0.014 0.007 0.017
(0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.055)
Widowed 0.018 0.017 0.016 -0.018
(0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.041)
Divorced 0.012 0.011 -0.016 -0.014
(0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.037)
Separated 0.015 0.017 0.009 0.000
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.028)
Television 0.004 0.003 0.009
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Radio -0.007 -0.007 -0.004
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Electricity 0.007 0.008 -0.001
(0.008) (0.007) (0.009)
Urban household -0.011 -0.011
(0.007) (0.007)
Constant 0.092* 0.102** 0.079 0.131
(0.048) (0.050) (0.083) (0.144)
Observations 3,843 3,843 3,843 3,843
R-squared 0.139 0.143 0.265 0.908
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Table 2.15 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: = 1 if respondent thinks FGC should continue, = 0 otherwise.
Interviewer fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnicity fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Religion fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Village fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Household fixed effects No No No Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Chapter 3
Persistent Norms and Tipping
Points: Female Genital Cutting
in Burkina Faso
3.1 Introduction
Each year more than three million girls undergo female genital cutting (World Health
Organization, 2012). Female genital cutting (FGC)1—a practice wherein a woman’s
genitalia are partially or totally removed for nonmedical reasons—has no documented
health benefits, and this procedure can have profound negative health effects on the
women subjected to the practice. Women who have undergone FGC are more than twice
as likely to experience birthing complications (Jones et al., 1999; Banks et al., 2006) and
25 percent more likely to contract sexually transmitted diseases (Wagner, 2015). They
are also more likely to experience anxiety, depression, and marital conflict (Dorkenoo,
1999). These complications can create barriers to women working effectively both inside
and outside of the household, which can contribute to economic underdevelopment in
communities that practice FGC. Yet the practice persists because of beliefs that FGC
1Female genital cutting (FGC) is also referred to as “female circumcision” and “female genital
mutilation.” I use the terminology FGC because it makes a larger distinction between FGC and
male circumcision than does the term female circumcision, and it is more value-neutral than the
term “mutilation.” Throughout this manuscript I use the terminology FGC, “cut,” and “cutting”
interchangeably.
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will discourage infidelity among women subjected to the practice (Shell-Duncan and
Hernlund, 2001), as well as beliefs that women who have undergone FGC attain higher
standards of beauty, cleanliness, and femininity (Toubia and Sharief, 2003).
Why does FGC persists as a norm when there are no medical benefits and there are
many potential physical and psychological costs? I propose a new theoretical explanation
for this phenomenon, and I test this explanation using observational data from Burkina
Faso’s Demographic and Health Survey. Additionally, I investigate whether there is a
tipping point in the proportion of community members abandoning FGC.
Gender-biased harmful practices, including FGC, child marriage, and sex-selective
abortion, have become a significant topic of public and political discourse. Many gender-
biased harmful practices are a result of entrenched social norms which, once in place,
are very difficult to alter without external stimuli such as public policy interventions.
Whether those interventions can change individual behavior or whether they must
be targeted toward changing community-wide beliefs and behavior is the subject of
an important debate (Powell, 2017). If FGC is a social coordination norm—that is,
communities will abandon FGC if and only if a sufficient proportion of households within
the community agree to abandon the practice—as posited by Mackie (1996), deviating
from the social norm is so socially costly that individuals or households will not do so
on their own. Many development organizations and governments working to reduce the
prevalence of FGC design interventions with the belief that FGC is a social coordination
norm. Agencies and governments operating under this assumption advocate for public
declarations by community members that they will abandon FGC if a sufficient number
of community members also agree to abandon the practice.
Recent empirical findings show that FGC is not a social coordination problem in
Sudan (Efferson et al., 2015) and that individual- and household-level factors contribute
to a larger share of the practice’s persistence than do community-level factors in West
Africa (Bellemare et al., 2015). This suggests that development agencies could broaden
the set of policy interventions in order to address the support for and the perpetuation
of FGC. Specifically, agencies could design policies aimed to change individual- or
household-level preferences.
This chapter’s contribution is threefold. First, recent empirical findings that FGC is
not a social coordination norm suggest the need for a new theoretical explanation for why
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FGC persists as a practice in many communities. I posit a new theory that highlights
preference heterogeneity. I hypothesize that while households may wait to abandon FGC
until a certain proportion of community members have already abandoned the practice,
each household may have a different threshold, i.e. it may require a different proportion
of community members to abandon FGC before it also abandons the practice.
Second, I test this theory with observational data from Burkina Faso, and I show that
households do have heterogeneous thresholds. This heterogeneity provides important
insights into why FGC persists; in a community with heterogeneous preferences there
may not be a tipping point in the rate of FGC, and there may in fact be stable internal
equilibrium. The distribution of household preferences has a large influence on the
effectiveness of policies aimed at reducing the incidence of FGC (Platteau et al., 2017).
Third, I explore whether there is a tipping point in the proportion of community
members practicing FGC beyond which the prevalence of the practice should shrink
to zero or if there are stable internal equilibria in the rates of FGC. I show that some
communities in my data have a stable equilibrium at low levels of FGC, suggesting that
achieving at a low rate of FGC may be feasible; completely eliminating FGC, however,
may be more difficult.
The strength of my approach comes from the long time period I analyze using three
cross-sectional datasets from 1998, 2003, and 2010 from Burkina Faso that include
women born between 1949 and 1995 and their daughters. The use of this six-decade
timeframe is important when considering an intergenerational problem and long-term
dynamics of FGC as well as the external validity of my estimates.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 3.2 I provide
background information on FGC. Section 3.3 provides a conceptual framework for
analysis, and section 3.4 introduces the data and descriptive statistics. Section 3.5
discusses the empirical framework and estimation strategy, and section 3.6 present the
results of the analysis. In section 3.7 I interpret the results and conclude.
3.2 Background
The practice of FGC is concentrated in 29 countries across parts of Africa, Asia, and
the Middle East (UNICEF, 2013), as well as among immigrant communities from those
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parts of the world now living in other countries. The World Health Organization (2012)
classifies FGC into four types. Clitoridectomy (Type I) includes any partial or total
removal of the clitoris, excision (Type II) includes partial or total removal of the clitoris
and the labia minora, and infibulation (Type III) consists of narrowing the vaginal
opening by sewing or stitching the labia together. Type IV includes all other procedures
including pricking, piercing, incising, scraping or cauterizing the female genitalia for
non-medical reasons.
In Burkina Faso, the vast majority of girls who undergo FGC, experience either
clitoridectomy or excision. In the data, less than four percent of girls who undergo FGC
experience infibulation. This figure is comparable to Jones et al. (1999), who show,
using gynecological exams, that five percent of women in their Burkina Faso sample had
undergone infibulation. The majority of procedures occur at very young ages in Burkina
Faso. In the data, more than 94 percent of girls who undergo the procedure are cut
before the age of 11, and approximately 42 percent of procedures occur during infancy.
The cultural norms surrounding FGC vary widely. Most scholars speculate that
the practice originated as a way to reduce premarital and extramarital sex and thus
ensure the paternity of children (Mackie, 1996; Boyle, 2005; Dorkenoo, 1999). Though
FGC arose and may persist in part in response to male preferences, today women are
primarily responsible for the decision to cut their daughters (Mackie, 1996; Toubia and
Sharief, 2003). Undergoing FGC is seen as a rite of passage, or a way to join the society
of women in the community (Toubia and Sharief, 2003). Some societies view the clitoris
as a masculine part of a woman’s body that must be removed in order for the girl to
be fully female (Gruenbaum, 2000; Shell-Duncan and Hernlund, 2001). Other societies
believe that girls who have not undergone FGC are “unclean,” and these girls are not
allowed to wash dishes or touch certain items.
Burkina Faso is well suited to studying how and why the norm of FGC persists or
wanes. The rate of FGC in Burkina Faso, while still high, fell substantially during the
60-year period for which I have data. This heterogeneity in rates of FGC by year of
birth allows me to explore how household decisions change when faced with different
rates of FGC. Further, it is possible to speculate about the future trends in countries
where the rate of FGC remains high. Guinea, Mali, and Sierre Leone are three such
countries, where rates of FGC are respectively 96 percent, 89 percent, and 88 percent of
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adult women (UNICEF, 2013).
3.3 Theoretical Model
In order to analyze a household’s decision about whether its daughter should undergo
FGC, I present an adapted version of the social coordination norm model proposed by
Mackie (1996) and add to it Schelling (1978)’s model of critical mass.
3.3.1 Social Coordination Norm
Consider a household’s decision of whether its daughter will undergo FGC. I refer to
the household as a single unit and remain agnostic about the decision-making process
within the household because I am able to observe only the final decision made by the
household (i.e., the girl’s FGC status) and the constraints faced by the household, but
not the intrahousehold bargaining process. Assume that the household knows the extent
to which community members practice FGC. This is not an unreasonable assumption,
because the FGC procedure is often performed in conjunction with a ceremony and
community members often know who participated in such a ceremony (Cloward, 2016).
Let r ∈ [0, 1] represent the rate of FGC at the community level, and let g ∈ {0, 1}
represent the daughter’s FGC status where g = 1 denotes a girl who has undergone
FGC. A household takes r as given and chooses between two strategies; (i) to cut its
daughter (g = 1) and (ii) not to cut its daughter (g = 0). Let sgi(r) represent the social
cost associated with strategy g for household i when faced with FGC rate r. This social
cost is a function of r because social sanctions delivered by the community are related
to the proportion of community members practicing FGC.
I first normalize to zero the payoff accruing to a household that does not cut its
daughter in a community in which the cutting rate equals zero, that is s0i(0) = 0. Then,
let s0i(r) ≥ 0 and s1i(r) ≥ 0. These social costs include reduced marriage prospects of
the girl (Wagner, 2015) and reduced acceptance into the community (Toubia and Sharief,
2003). Additionally, s0i(r) may include perceived disregard for religious edicts (Cloward,
2016) and inferior perceived beauty and femininity (Shell-Duncan and Hernlund, 2001).
Finally, let ci ≥ 0 be the perceived non-social costs—monetary, psychological, and
physical—associated with cutting the girl.
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Assume that the payoff accruing to a household that abstains from FGC is monoton-
ically decreasing in the proportion of community members that practice FGC, and that
the payoff accruing to a household that practices FGC is monotonically increasing in
the proportion of community members that practice FGC.
Assumption 1. ∂s0i(r)∂r < 0, i.e. the social cost accruing to a household that abstains
from practicing FGC is monotonically decreasing in the proportion of community members
that practices FGC.
Assumption 2. ∂s1i(r)∂r > 0, i.e. the social cost accruing to a household that practices
FGC is monotonically increasing in the proportion of community members that practices
FGC.
It is not necessary to assume a functional form for the payoff functions. It is, however,
important to consider the number of times the payoff functions for the two strategies
could cross. Assumptions 1 and 2 allow us to conclude that the payoff functions can
cross at most once in the space of FGC rates.
Lemma 1. Under assumptions 1 and 2, the potential payoffs accruing to households
under each strategy cross at most once in the space of community FGC rates.
Figure 3.1 shows this graphically by displaying the potential payoff accruing to a
household if it practices FGC or abstains from FGC, dependent on the proportion of
community members practicing FGC. Let s0i(1) = sˆ0i and s1i(0) = sˆ1i. Assume that
s1i(1) = 0 because there is no social cost of practicing FGC in a community in which all
members practice FGC. Most households receive a higher payoff if they adhere to local
norms. That is, in most cases, a household in a community in which all members practice
FGC will achieve a higher payoff if the daughter undergoes FGC (i.e., −ci > −sˆ0i).
Conversely, a household in a community in which no members practice FGC will achieve
a higher payoff if the daughter does not undergo FGC (i.e., 0 > −sˆ1i − ci).
For ease of exposition, and without loss of generality, I use a payoff structure that is
a linear function of the rate of FGC in the community. Figure 3.1 shows that when the
proportion of community members practicing FGC is above r∗i , the household derives
a higher payoff from practicing FGC than from abstaining. This situation flips if the
proportion of practicing households is below r∗i .
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Proposition 1. If r < r∗i , household i will abstain from FGC for its daughter, and if
r > r∗i , household i will choose to have its daughter undergo FGC.
Proof. Normalize s0i(0) to zero, and assume that s1i(1) = 0. Let s0i(1) = sˆ0i and
s1i(0) = sˆ1i. If Lemma 1 is satisfied, then the household has a single indifference point
at r∗i .
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Figure 3.1: Household i′s Payoff Structure
3.3.2 The Threshold Model of Collective Behavior
Mackie (1996) assumes homogeneous households within a community such that each
household is facing the same costs and benefits of cutting. This implies that r∗i = r
∗ ∀ i ∈
H, where H is the set of households in the community. According to this model, if a
community can gather at least 1 − r∗ community members to declare that they will
abandon FGC, all community members will abandon FGC. That is, r∗ is the tipping
point for this community. This is the crux of the policies that arrange public declarations
for the abandonment of FGC. Bellemare, Novak, & Steinmetz (2015) and Efferson et
al. (2015) show that highly heterogeneous cutting rates—between zero and one—exist
across communities. These findings are inconsistent with the hypotheses generated by
Mackie’s theory because if social sanctions prevent households from deviating from the
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norm and if a single tipping point is guaranteed in every community, one would expect
to see rates of FGC that are either very close to zero or very close to one.
Hypothesis 1. Households within a community have heterogeneous thresholds r∗i .
If instead each individual values the benefits and costs to cutting differently, there
are as many variations to figure 3.1 as there are community members. This implies that
each individual will require a different proportion of community members to abandon
FGC before deciding to switch from practicing to abandoning FGC. This indifference
point—referred to in this chapter as a threshold—is the proportion of community
members that must abandon FGC in order for the household to abandon the practice.
In figure 3.1, r∗i is this household’s threshold. In this chapter I test whether households
in a given community have heterogenous thresholds.
3.3.3 Tipping Point or Stable Internal Equilibria
A key insight from Efferson et al. (2015) is that if thresholds are heterogeneous within
a community, a tipping point as proposed in Mackie (1996) may not exist. (Schelling,
1978, p.105) makes the point that in the face of heterogeneous thresholds (what he refers
to as “cross-over points”), multiple stable equilibria may exist, some of which are interior
solutions. Drawing on Schelling’s model of critical mass, I investigate whether there is a
tipping point for the practice of FGC in communities in Burkina Faso. To do this, I
analyze the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of community member thresholds.
Continue to assume that a household observes the rate of FGC in the community
before making the decision for their daughter. Let f(r∗i ) be the probability density
function (PDF) and F (r) be the CDF of the thresholds of the community members.
Then, F (r) =
∫ r
0 f(r
∗
i )dr
∗
i represents the proportion of community members with a
threshold that is lower than or equal to r.
If all households have the same threshold, the PDF of community thresholds would
be a vertical line at the level r∗, and the CDF of the proportion of households favoring
FGC would resemble curve 1 in figure 3.2. In this curve, no household favors FGC if the
rate of FGC is below r∗, and all households favor FGC for their daughter if the rate is
above r∗. Alternatively, if thresholds are heterogeneous, the CDF of the proportion of
households favoring FGC could resemble curve 2 (or a myriad of other curves). In this
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particular rendering of a CDF in a community with heterogeneous household thresholds,
a small proportion of household will practice FGC even if they believe that no one else
will. The proportion of community members favoring FGC is higher if the proportion of
community members practicing FGC is larger. In this hypothetical community there are
some households that will abstain from practicing FGC even if they expect every other
household in the community will practice FGC.
0 1
0
1
1
r∗
2
Proportion of Community Expected to Practice FGC
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
o
f
C
o
m
m
u
n
it
y
F
av
o
ri
n
g
F
G
C
Figure 3.2: Hypothetical Community CDFs
Figure 3.3 shows hypothetical CDFs of the proportion of community household
favoring FGC as a function of the proportion of community household that are expected
to practice FGC. The dashed line is the 45-degree line.
Any point at which the CDF crosses the 45-degree line, or F (r) = r, is an equilib-
rium—either stable or unstable. Curve 1 of figure 3.3 shows a community in which a
small portion of households value FGC sufficiently that they will practice FGC even if
no other household practices. Because these households practice FGC, they will draw
a few more community households with a low threshold into practicing FGC until the
community reaches point A. If instead the rate of FGC is higher than the rate at point
A, there are fewer households favoring FGC (as a function of practicing households)
than there are practicing households. This would lead these households to abandon
FGC, pushing the equilibrium to point A. Thus, point A is a stable equilibrium, and it
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Figure 3.3: Hypothetical Community CDFs
is the only equilibrium on curve 1.
If instead the community’s distribution of thresholds resembles curve 2, there are
three equilibria, two of which are stable. If the proportion of households practicing FGC
is below point B, fewer households favor FGC than there are households expected to
practice, so the proportion of households practicing FGC will fall to zero. If instead, the
proportion of household practicing FGC is above point B, more households will be drawn
to practicing FGC until point C is reached. If the proportion of households practicing
FGC is higher than at point C, some will decide to stop practicing, and the proportion
of practicing households will return to point C. A community with thresholds, r∗i of
community members distributed as shown in curve 2 has two stable equilibria—one at a
high rate of FGC and one at zero, and one unstable equilibrium at point B.
Thus, if households have heterogeneous thresholds it is possible that there is a tipping
point, as is illustrated with curve 2 at point B. It is also possible that a tipping point does
not exist, as is illustrated with curve 1. Thus, if community members have heterogeneous
thresholds, the existence of a tipping point is not guaranteed and it is possible that there
is a stable equilibrium at an interior rate of cutting (i.e., r ∈ (0, 1)). Below, I use data
from Burkina Faso to determine which phenomenon is most prevalent in communities
across the country.
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3.3.4 Estimating the Cumulative Distribution Function
A household’s threshold is unobservable. It is a function of individual preferences and
intrahousehold bargaining power. Additionally, each individual may have difficulty
articulating their threshold if asked via survey. Fortunately, for the purpose of estimating
a community’s CDF, it is not necessary to identify a household’s threshold. Instead, by
revealed preference, it is possible to recover the community CDF from the behavior of
the community members. In fact, the CDF at rate r is exactly equal to the proportion
of households that opt to practice FGC when faced with rate of FGC r in the previous
cohort.
Let pi(r) be the proportion of households that opt to practice FGC when faced with
rate of FGC r, and let gi = 1 if the girl undergoes FGC. Then, pi(r) = F (r).
Proposition 2. F (r) = pi(r).
Proof. The probability that girl i undergoes FGC when her parents are faced with rate
r is equal to the proportion of households that opt to practice FGC when faced with
rate r, or pi(r) = P(gi = 1|r). Furthermore, the probability that a girl undergoes FGC
when faced with rate r is equal to the probability that her household’s threshold is less
than r, or P(gi = 1|r) = P(r∗i < r). And, P(r∗i < r) =
∫ r
0 f(r
∗
i )dr
∗
i = F (r).
pi(r) = P(gi = 1|r) = P(r∗i < r) =
∫ r
0
f(r∗i )dr
∗
i = F (r)
Thus, it is possible to recover the CDF of household thresholds by estimating the rate
of FGC in a cohort given the rate of FGC of the previous cohort, because pi(r) = F (r).
In the next section I discuss the data used in this analysis.
3.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
I use publicly available data from the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) for Burkina
Faso. I use three cross-sectional datasets collected in 1998, 2003, and 2010. The DHS
includes female respondents aged 15 to 49 at the time of survey, thus I have data for
women born between 1949 and 1995. A respondent provides information on her health
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and her children’s health, along with many characteristics of her partner, if relevant,
and the household in which she lives. I identify in which department and province
a household resides by using the geographic coordinate information provided by the
DHS. There are 45 provinces in Burkina Faso2 and 351 departments. Provinces are
the second administrative level in Burkina Faso, one level below region, one level above
departments, and two levels above villages. Combining three cross-sectional datasets
facilitates the investigation of a much longer timeframe than any one dataset provides,
which is important when considering long-term dynamics in FGC.
Women report their own FGC status and the FGC status of their daughters. These
reports are susceptible to reporting bias. In order to determine the likelihood and extent
of misreporting, I compare my data to data from Burkina Faso collected in 1998 in
which gynecological exams are used to estimate the prevalence of FGC (Jones et al.,
1999). This study includes women attending rural clinics in two provinces of Burkina
Faso (Baze`ga and Zoundwe´og) who are between 15 and 55 at the time of data collection.
They find that 93 percent of women in their sample have undergone FGC. Restricting
my sample to the rural areas in the two specified provinces and weighting rates of FGC
by cohort according to the proportion of their sample in each cohort, I find a rate of
FGC of 89 percent. This four percentage point difference in the rate of FGC may be
even smaller given that the sample used by Jones et al. (1999) includes women up to the
age of 55 in 1998 while my data include women up to the age of 49, and this cohort has
the highest observed rate of FGC. Further, their data were collected in clinics, and it is
possible that the women attending the clinics have more health complications than the
average woman in these areas, and some of these health complications may have been
the result of FGC. While this does not rule out the possibility of reporting bias, I argue
that it is not a large concern in this setting.
Table 3.1 shows descriptive statistics for the three samples used in my analyses.
These three cross-sections provide information from 24,474 women born between 1949
and 1995 who report their FGC status (shown in column 1). In many specifications, I
use data only from the 6,873 women who have a daughter who is old enough to have
undergone FGC and who report their daughter’s FGC status (column 2). This sample
2The provinces were redrawn between 1998 and 2003. I use the geographic coordinates of the villages
sampled in 1998 to determine in which modern province the village lies.
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is restricted to women with a daughter who is 11 years or older because 94 percent of
women who underwent FGC were cut before the age of 11. Including daughters younger
than 11 would risk counting girls as uncut when in fact they will undergo FGC at a later
date. In a small number of analyses I include only the 5,934 women who report their
daughter’s FGC status and who themselves underwent FGC (column 3).
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
(1) (2) (3)
Full Sample Respondents Cut Respondents
with Daughters with Daughters
Respondent Underwent FGC 0.749 0.863 1.000
(0.003) (0.004) (0.000)
Daughter Underwent FGC 0.383 0.437
(0.006) (0.006)
Respondent Ever Attended School 0.280 0.104 0.103
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Respondent Ever Married 0.755 1.000 1.000
(0.003) (0.000) (0.000)
Respondent’s Partner Educated 0.125 0.126
(0.004) (0.004)
Average Rate of FGC in Province
Cohort
0.745 0.633 0.654
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Average Rate of FGC in
Province-Ethnic Cohort
0.744 0.637 0.663
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Respondent in Polygamous
Marriage
0.568 0.567
(0.006) (0.006)
Respondent Year of Birth 1981 1967 1967
(0.045) (0.086) (0.092)
Respondent’s Partner’s Year of
Birth
1955 1956
(0.137) (0.145)
Daughter’s Year of Birth 1988 1989
(0.080) (0.087)
Religion: Catholic 0.246 0.240 0.226
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Protestant 0.062 0.054 0.046
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Continued on next page
64
Table 3.1 (continued)
(1) (2) (3)
Full Sample Respondents Cut Respondents
with Daughters with Daughters
Muslim 0.592 0.580 0.610
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
Other 0.100 0.126 0.118
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Household Owns TV 0.189 0.117 0.119
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Household Owns Radio 0.733 0.702 0.708
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
Ethnic Group: Bobo 0.037 0.032 0.032
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Dioula 0.026 0.028 0.030
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
FulFulde/Peul 0.067 0.057 0.061
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Gourmatche 0.062 0.062 0.055
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Gourounsi 0.047 0.042 0.031
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Lobi 0.045 0.029 0.031
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Mossi 0.542 0.588 0.598
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
Senoufo 0.049 0.049 0.053
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Touareg/Bella 0.012 0.011 0.005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Bissa 0.040 0.041 0.044
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Other 0.073 0.059 0.061
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Household is in Urban Area 0.307 0.206 0.209
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 24,474 6,873 5,934
Standard deviations in parentheses
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Approximately 75 percent of women surveyed have undergone FGC. Only 28 percent
of surveyed women are educated—bluntly defined here as having attended at least some
formal primary school. Almost 76 percent have been or are currently married, the
average year of birth of respondents is 1981, 25 percent of respondents are Catholic and
59 percent are Muslim, 19 percent of respondents own a television and 73 percent own a
radio. Fifty-four percent of respondents are from the Mossi ethnic group, the remaining
46 percent belong to 10 other ethnic groups. Thirty-one percent of respondents live in
an urban area.
Thirty-eight percent of women who have a daughter 11 years of age or older state
that their daughter has undergone FGC, while 44 percent of women who have undergone
FGC themselves have a daughter who has undergone FGC. Due to data limitations, I use
the information on the woman’s oldest daughter’s FGC status only. The data collected
in 1998 and 2003 include information on the oldest daughter only, data collected in 2010
include data on all daughters and show that there is little variation in FGC status of a
woman’s daughters. Thus, using the woman’s oldest daughter only should yield very
similar results to using information on multiple daughters. The women included in the
daughter analyses (columns 2 and 3) are, on average, older, less educated, and have a
higher rate of FGC than the full sample of women. This is unsurprising since these are
women with relatively old daughters, and the rate of FGC has been decreasing over time
in Burkina Faso while the rate of education has been rising.
Figure 3.4 displays the rate of FGC by year of birth. The substantial amount of
heterogeneity in rates of FGC over time in Burkina Faso which makes Burkina Faso an
ideal place to analyze changes in the practice of FGC.
3.4.1 Identifying the Community & Cohort
In order to estimate the rate of FGC at the community level, I first identify the year of
birth of the respondent and the year of birth of the respondent’s oldest daughter. Year of
birth of respondents and daughters (of different women) do overlap, given that my data
provide such a long timeframe. I combine information on self-reported FGC status of
the respondents (using the full sample of 24,474 women) with the reported FGC status
of daughters (6,873 daughters). I then estimate the rate of FGC in the daughter’s cohort
within her community.
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Figure 3.4: Rate of FGC in Burkina Faso by Year of Birth
I define cohort as the girls born five years or less prior to the birth of the daughter
in question. I use the information on girls born five years prior because I assume that
the household is able to observe the rate of FGC for girls in preceding years of birth
before making the decision for its own daughter. This definition of cohort has the added
benefit of minimizing the reflection problem (Manski, 1993).3
Correctly identifying the community is especially important in this type of analysis.
Ideally, I would have information on the social network of observed households. In
the absence of this data, I use multiple definitions of the community and analyze the
consistency, or lack thereof, of my results between definitions. I use the marriage market
as a proxy for the community because people are more likely to interact with individuals
in their marriage pool as well as see them as the relevant reference group for norms.
In Burkina Faso, inter-ethnic marriage is uncommon (Breusers et al., 1998), thus I use
ethnic group in every definition of community. It is common for Burkinabe women to
move out of their natal village for marriage (Henry et al., 2004), thus I do not use village
as the definition of community.
For robustness I define the community in four ways. First, all girls in the same
province within the same ethnic group. In order to determine if province is too large
to accurately capture the community, I narrow the definition of community by looking
3The reflection problem arises when attempting to identify the effect of a group’s behavior on an
individual when that individual’s behavior simultaneously affects the group’s behavior.
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at only those girls in the same department. Recall that there are 45 provinces and 351
departments in Burkina Faso, so each province includes 7.8 departments, on average.
Thus, the second definition of community is all girls in the same department within
the same ethnic group. While households in rural communities are aware of the FGC
status of other girls in the community, this assumption may be less reasonable in urban
areas. Thus, the third definition of community is all girls in the same province within
the same ethnic group who live in the rural area. Lastly, religion plays a key role in the
marriage market. I focus on Catholics and Muslims because they are the most common
religions in Burkina Faso. Thus, the fourth definition of community is all girls in the
same province within the same ethnic group and same religious group.
3.5 Empirical Framework
In this section I explain my estimation strategy, relate it to the ideal experiment
for comparison, and I discuss threats to validity of my estimates. I begin by testing
Hypothesis 1, that is, whether thresholds are heterogeneous among households in Burkina
Faso. Second, I test whether there is a tipping point or stable internal equilibrium in
the rate of FGC in communities in Burkina Faso.
3.5.1 Tipping Point or Stable Internal Equilibrium
I begin by analyzing whether thresholds are heterogenous among households in Burkina
Faso by plotting the CDF of the proportion of households that decide to cut their
daughter as a function of the proportion of community members practicing FGC (where
community is defined in the four ways specified above). As stated in Proposition 2 it
is not possible to observe each household’s threshold r∗i . Instead, I am able to directly
observe the community CDF by estimating the proportion of households opting to
practice FGC as a function of the previous cohort’s rate of FGC, r.
I perform a kernel-weighted local polynomial smoothing regression of the rate of
FGC in community k for girls born in year t on the rate of FGC in community k among
girls in the cohort c born between t− 1 and t− 6. I use an an Epanechnikov kernel with
a polynomial smooth of degree two because higher order polynomials perform better at
the boundary points than lower order polynomials (Fan and Gijbels, 1996).
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rtk = f(rc∈[t−6,t−1],k) + ηtk (3.1)
If the CDFs resembles curve 1 in figure 3.2, households have homogenous thresholds.
Otherwise, we can conclude that thresholds are heterogeneous among households.
I then turn to analyzing whether there is a tipping point in communities or if there
are stable internal equilibria in the rate of FGC. I do this by determining how the CDFs
estimated using equation 3.1 interact with the 45-degree line, and I compare this to
figure 3.3.
3.5.2 Estimation Strategy
I estimate the likelihood that a girl will undergo FGC based on the rate of FGC in her
community within her cohort and her household characteristics. I estimate equation
3.2 for girls who have a mother who has undergone FGC. I restrict the sample to girls
with mothers who have undergone FGC because it is rare for a woman who has not
undergone FGC to have a daughter who has undergone FGC.
yitk = β0 + β1rck + β2mitk + β3fitk + β4xitk + β5dt + β6dm + β7df + β8s+ itk (3.2)
The subscripts denote girl i born in year t, whose relevant cohort is cohort c ∈
[t− 6, t− 1] whose mother is in cohort m, whose father is in cohort f , and who lives in
community k. Let yitk equal one if the respondent’s daughter has undergone FGC and
zero if her daughter has not undergone FGC. Let rck denote the rate of FGC in the girl’s
community-cohort, let mitk denote the level of education of the girl’s mother, and fitk
denote the level of education of the girl’s father. Let xitk be a vector of other control
variables, dt is a vector of the girl’s year of birth fixed effects, dm is a vector of mother’s
year of birth fixed effects, df is a vector of father’s year of birth fixed effects, and s is a
vector of survey wave fixed effects. Finally, itk is an error term with mean zero.
I estimate equation 3.2 using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. Because yitk
is binary, my use of OLS implies that each equation I estimate is a linear probability
model (LPM). In estimating an LPM rather than a logit or a probit model, I follow the
recommendations of Angrist and Pischke (2009). The primary benefits of using LPMs are
(i) LPMs do not rely on distributional assumptions for the error term that are required
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by logit and probit estimators, and (ii) LPMs do a much better job than probit models of
handling a large number of fixed effects (Angrist & Pischke, 2009 page 98). The primary
drawback to using LPMs is that LPMs produce errors that are heteroskedastic. I use
robust standard errors in all estimations in order to address this concern. An additional
drawback of LPMs is that LPMs can predict a likelihood of FGC that is outside of the
[0, 1] interval. This is not a large concern in this case, as I am not attempting to forecast
the likelihood that a girl will undergo FGC. In a series of robustness checks, I estimate
equation 3.2 using logit regression (see table B.2 in the appendix).
3.5.3 Ideal Dataset and Threats to Validity
In order to appreciate the threats to validity of my approach, it is useful to imagine the
ideal dataset for addressing this question. Assume first that in each community there is
a set time when all girls in a given community undergo FGC, if their household decides
to practice FGC.
Now, imagine that a researcher can go to each household within a community to
ascertain the household’s exact threshold. The researcher should then determine which
households have girls who are near the age of undergoing FGC, let’s call them group
1. Assume the researcher knows the rate of FGC among the previous cohort, then
given the distribution of household thresholds among group 1, the researcher could
determine what the rate of FGC will be in group 1. Based on the distribution of
thresholds among the households of girls born in the subsequent year, call them group 2,
the researcher could determine what the rate of FGC will be in the subsequent period.
The household threshold is a complicated function of individual preferences for FGC
and intrahousehold bargaining power. Moreover, it is likely difficult for individuals to
articulate their preference for FGC.
A much more reliable approach involves observing a households revealed preference.
Consider instead a dataset in which there are 100 communities. Each community has an
identical distribution of thresholds. Each community, however, has a different rate of
FGC (imagine that this is, for example, a result of interventions in some communities).
One could then observe the rate of FGC among group 1 in all 100 communities. From
this information, a researcher could infer the distribution of thresholds within the 100
communities. Unfortunately, it is not possible for the observer to guarantee that the
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distribution of thresholds is identical in each of these communities.
Instead, imagine a world in which each household in a community has 10 daughters,
each born one year apart. In year one, a researcher could give false information to each
household regarding the rate of FGC in the community. The researcher could then
observe the choice of the household made to cut or refrain from cutting their daughter in
group 1. In the second year, the researcher could return to the household and give new
false information regarding the rate of FGC and observe whether the household cuts its
daughter in group 2. Assuming that all households believe the researcher each year, and
if the falsely reported rate of FGC is in increments of 10 percentage points, the researcher
could create bounds on each household’s threshold within 10 percentage points. Finding
such a community is unlikely, moreover this strategy relies on the assumption that the
household’s threshold does not change within that 10 year timeframe.
These research designs are not feasible. The data that I use are as close to ideal
as is possible because I use data on revealed preference, and I observe heterogeneity
in the rate of FGC within a given community. It is, however, important to highlight
key limitations of the data. First, all of the research designs above assume that the
researcher has correctly identified the relevant community. In the ideal dataset, one
would ask respondents who they view as the relevant community or who they interact
with on a regular basis in order to identify the social network. In lieu of that information,
I have identified the most likely definition of community according the literature, and in
order to alleviate some of this concern, I vary the definition of community to determine
if my results are consistent across definition.
Second, I assume that the distribution of thresholds within a community do not
change over the period in which I observe them. This is a strong assumption since
households observed at a later date may, for example, have more information about the
health complications associated with FGC or may have experienced a religious leader
publicly denounce FGC. More fundamentally, each year the households that make the
decision to cut their daughters are different households than the year before or the year
after. If thresholds are randomly allocated among households with daughters of different
ages, the fact that I observe different households does not bias my measurement of the
threshold distribution. If instead thresholds are correlated with age of the daughter, this
could have some effect on the observed distribution of thresholds. If for example, people
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with high thresholds had daughters born in 1990, while people with low thresholds had
daughters born in 1995, this could make the CDF appear volatile. The use of the local
polynomial smoothing regression addresses this issue.
Third, I assume that households have a clear picture of the proportion of households
that practice FGC. This is reasonable for rural communities as the FGC procedure
is typically celebrated and households, and particularly women in those households,
are aware of who has undergone FGC. This, however, may be a strong assumption for
urban communities. Thus, I conduct robustness checks in which I analyze only rural
communities.
3.6 Results
I begin by examining whether households have heterogeneous thresholds. I then analyze
whether there is a tipping point or stable internal equilibria in the rate of FGC in
communities in Burkina Faso. Finally, I examine the various definitions of community
to determine which are statistically equivalent and which different.
3.6.1 Thresholds and Tipping Point
Figure 3.5 displays the CDF of household thresholds for all of Burkina Faso using the
ethnic group within the province as the definition of community. One can see that within
Burkina Faso thresholds are heterogeneous because the CDF does not resemble curve 1
in figure 3.2, and in fact looks very similar to curve 2 in figure 3.2.
Because the CDF crosses the 45-degree line from above, figure 3.5 indicates that
there is stable interior equilibrium in the rate of FGC in Burkina Faso. This suggests
that the rate of FGC may remain close to 10% in Burkina Faso for some time. It is,
however, a bit misleading to analyze the CDF for Burkina Faso as a whole. Instead, we
should draw conclusions from community-level figures.
I now turn to analyzing whether there is a tipping point or stable internal equilibrium
in the proportion of community members practicing FGC in communities in Burkina
Faso. Figures 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8 show the CDFs for a select sample of three province-ethnic
groups. Panel a in each figure is the CDF for the entire province-ethnic group, panel b is
72
Figure 3.5: CDF for Burkina Faso
Community defined as Province-Ethnic Cohort, with 95% confidence interval
the CDF for the province-ethnic group in the rural area only, panels c and, if applicable,4
d include data from the department-ethnic groups from departments within the given
province. Panel e shows the CDF for Catholics in the province-ethnic group, and panel f
shows the CDF for Muslims in the province-ethnic group.
The CDFs for the Mossi in Mouhoun (figure 3.6) suggest that a stable low-rate
of FGC is possible among this community. The rural communities appear to behave
similarly to the province as a whole. The observed department includes only low rates of
FGC, suggesting that this department may be different from the 12 other departments
in Mouhoun. Catholics have a lower rate of FGC than Muslims in Mohoun.
The CDFs for the Senoufo in Ganzourgo (figure 3.7) show that the observed rates of
FGC are higher among this province-ethnic group than among the Mossi in Mouhoun.
Panel a suggest that this group may have had a tipping point at a rate of FGC of
approximately 95 percent. The rural community behaves similarly to the province as
a whole, though the very low rates of FGC observed in panel a appear to occur in the
urban areas. The observed department (of which is 78 percent of surveyed households
lie in an urban area) behaves similarly to the province as a whole, but more similarly to
4I include only communities with 50 or more girls for whom the decision to practice FGC is observed.
This excludes a large number of department-ethnic groups as well as some province-ethnic groups.
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(a) All Province-Ethnic Group (b) Rural Province-Ethnic Group
(c) Department 1-Ethnic Group (d)
(e) Catholic-Province-Ethnic Group (f) Muslim-Province-Ethnic Group
Figure 3.6: CDFs from the Mossi in Mouhoun
with 95% confidence interval
the rural area. Lastly, Catholics and Muslims behave similarly to one another among
the Senoufou in Ganzourgo.
The CDFs for the Mossi in Ioba (figure 3.8) suggest that there is a tipping point in
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(a) All Province-Ethnic Group (b) Rural Province-Ethnic Group
(c) Department 1-Ethnic Group (d)
(e) Catholic-Province-Ethnic Group (f) Muslim-Province-Ethnic Group
Figure 3.7: CDFs from the Senoufo in Ganzourgo
with 95% confidence interval
the rate of FGC among this province-ethnic group. The rural area behaves similarly
to the full province-ethnic group. The two departments have little data for drawing
conclusions, but the first department (panel c) appears to behave very similarly to the
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rural community (though 79 percent of surveyed households in this department lie in an
urban area). The Catholic and Muslim households behave similarly to each other and to
the broader province-ethnic group.
(a) All Province-Ethnic Group (b) Rural Province-Ethnic Group
(c) Department 1-Ethnic Group (d) Department 2-Ethnic Group
(e) Catholic-Province-Ethnic Group (f) Muslim-Province-Ethnic Group
Figure 3.8: CDFs from the Mossi in Ioba
with 95% confidence interval
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3.6.2 Likelihood That a Girl Undergoes FGC
Table 3.2 presents the results of estimating equation 3.2 using five definitions of the
girl’s community-cohort. Cohort is defined as all girls born in the five years prior to the
year of birth of the girl in question. Column 1 defines the girl’s community-cohort as
all girls who live in the same province and are part of the same ethnic group, column
2 defines the girl’s community-cohort as all girls who live in the same department and
are part of the same ethnic group. Column 3 estimates equation 3.2 defines the girl’s
community-cohort as all girls who live in the province, are part of the same ethnic group,
and is restricted to those living in a rural area. Columns 4 and 5 defines the girl’s
community-cohort as all girls who live in the same province, are part of the same ethnic
group, are part of the same religious group.
Table 3.2: LPM Estimation Results for Whether Girl Undergoes FGC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Province-
Ethnic
Cohort
Department-
Ethnic
Cohort
Province-
Ethnic Rural
Cohort
Province-
Ethnic
Catholic
Cohort
Province-
Ethnic
Muslim
Cohort
Rate of FGC in Community 0.580*** 0.568*** 0.588*** 0.436*** 0.548***
(0.048) (0.034) (0.044) (0.070) (0.066)
Urban Household -0.037* -0.037* 0.030 -0.056**
(0.020) (0.021) (0.039) (0.026)
Religion [Omitted: Catholic]
Protestant -0.034 -0.049 -0.020
(0.030) (0.041) (0.045)
Muslim 0.076*** 0.076*** 0.096***
(0.015) (0.017) (0.021)
Other 0.064** 0.048 0.061
(0.029) (0.035) (0.038)
Constant 0.511*** 0.583*** 0.615*** 0.692* 1.347***
(0.161) (0.187) (0.193) (0.356) (0.191)
Observations 5,934 4,523 3,493 1,079 2,818
R-squared 0.215 0.237 0.228 0.297 0.213
Controls included: Ethnicity, religion, education level of the mother, education level of the father,
proxies for wealth, rural indicator, polygamy indicator, mother’s year of birth FE, father’s year of birth
FE daughter’s year of birth FE.
Standard Errors Clustered at the Province Level.
***p<0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
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Table 3.2 shows that the rate of FGC in the girl’s community cohort plays an
important role in determining the girl’s likelihood of undergoing FGC, however the
likelihood that a girl undergoes FGC is not fully determined by the rate of FGC in
her community-cohort. Coefficients range between 0.436 and 0.588 suggesting that a
girl living in a community in which r = 1 is between 43.6 and 58.8 percentage points
more likely to undergo FGC than a girl living in a community in which no one practices
FGC. These two extremes (r = 0 and r = 1) are uncommon in my data. A more useful
conceptualization of the results is that for each 10 percentage point increase in the rate
of FGC, a girl is between 4.4 and 5.9 percentage points more likely to undergo FGC.
The coefficients on the rate of FGC within the community (variably defined) are
similar but not identical across definitions of the community. Following Pei et al. (2016)
I perform a Hausman (1978) specification test to determine whether these coefficients are
statistically similar. Table 3.3 reports the Hausman test statistics. The null hypothesis
of the Hausman test is that the difference between two coefficients is statistically zero.
In six of the reported cases, the null is rejected at the 5 percent level, and the null is
rejected in seven of cases at the 10 percent level. The coefficients on the rate of FGC in
the province-ethnic cohort, the rate of FGC on the province-ethnic-rural cohort, and the
rate of FGC in the province-ethnic cohort among Muslims are statistically similar to
each other.
Table 3.3: Hausman Specification Test Results Between Coefficient on Rate of FGC in
the Girl’s Community
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Province-
Ethnic
Cohort
Department-
Ethnic
Cohort
Province-
Ethnic Rural
Cohort
Province-
Ethnic
Catholic
Cohort
Department-Ethnic Cohort 5.46
(0.020)
Province-Ethnic Rural Cohort 0.07 4.16
(0.786) (0.041)
Province-Ethnic Catholic Cohort 17.54 4.08 13.18
(0.000) (0.043) (0.000)
Province-Ethnic Muslim Cohort 0.02 3.19 0.00 8.54
(0.883) (0.074) (0.973) (0.004)
χ2 value reported with p-value in parentheses
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3.6.3 Discussion
According to the regression results and Hausman tests, religion appears to be an
important component of the definition of community. This is shown to be true in
the CDFs for the Mossi in Mouhoun, though it is less apparent among the other two
featured province-ethnic groups. The rural communities appear to behave similarly
to the province as a whole. Further delineating the definition of community into the
department rather than the province seems to be important according to the regression
results, though the data limitations make drawing conclusions from the CDFs difficult.
Overall, it is clear that communities do behave differently from each other. In
particular, some communities appear to have a tipping point in the rate of FGC (this is
most clearly shown among the Mossi in Ioba), while other communities have a stable
interior equilibrium in the rate of FGC (as is suggested by the CDFs for the Mossi in
Mouhoun).
3.6.4 Limitations
I discussed the limitations of the research design in subsection 3.5.3. In addition to
those limitations, there are some limitations of the data. First, my analyses rely on
direct reporting of the respondent’s FGC status and daughter’s FGC status. Obtaining
physician records would lead to more precise estimates. I discussed the possible extent of
measurement error in section 3.4. Second, it is important to be aware of the differences
between the context of Burkina Faso between 1949 and 2010 and other settings. The
rate of FGC has declined substantially in Burkina Faso during the observation period,
while other countries have not seen a similar decline.
3.7 Discussion and Conclusions
I contribute to the current debate in the literature regarding whether FGC is a so-
cial coordination norm (Powell, 2017). If FGC is a social coordination norm, as was
posited by Mackie (1996), then the presence of a tipping point in the rate of FGC
in a community is guaranteed. Recent empirical evidence question this assertion by
showing that individual and household factors explain a substantially larger share of
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the persistence of FGC than do community-level factors (Bellemare et al., 2015) and
that rates of FGC within a community are often between zero and one (Efferson et al.,
2015). I propose a new theoretical explanation for why FGC persists. I show that
heterogenous thresholds—where threshold is defined as the proportion of community
members practicing FGC that makes a household indifferent between cutting and not
cutting its daughter—among households make the presence of a tipping point far from
guaranteed.
Using data from Burkina Faso that include women born between 1949 and 1995, I
show that households have heterogeneous thresholds. Some communities in Burkina
Faso do have a tipping point, and that tipping point has likely been reached in those
communities. There are communities, however, that have a stable equilibrium in the rate
of FGC in their community. This suggests that eliminating FGC from these communities
may be extremely difficult.
The strength of my research design comes from the six-decade long timeframe
provided by the three cross-sections of the Demographic and Health Survey data. These
data allow me to observe the same community over an extended period of time, observe
a household’s revealed preference for FGC (the decision to cut its daughter), and observe
variation in the constraints faced by households over time (changes in the rate of FGC).
Additionally, I am able to define the community in multiple ways in order to determine
whether my results are sensitive to the definition of community and further narrow my
definition of community based on those results.
That said, community is imperfectly defined in my analysis. Ideally, I would have
complete social network data from these communities. Additionally, I rely on reported
FGC status of the mother and daughter. Data from gynecological exams or other
more objective measures of FGC would be preferable. Finally, Burkina Faso is only
1 of 29 countries in which FGC is practiced. The social norms surrounding FGC are
heterogeneous between communities and certainly between countries. More research is
needed to determine how these findings hold in other settings.
My findings show that households are able to deviate from the social norm and are
willing to do so at different rates of FGC. This suggests that interventions that target
village-level behavior may be inefficient compared to interventions that target households
and individuals. Platteau et al. (2017) demonstrate that the distribution of household
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preferences (what they refer to as an aversion coefficient) greatly influences the way
in which a community will respond to laws or interventions aimed at decreasing the
prevalence of FGC or other harmful norms. If a community has a tipping point at a
high rate of FGC, the most efficient strategy is to target those most willing to deviate
from the norm. Alternatively, if a community has a stable equilibrium, targeting those
who are the least willing to abandon FGC could be the most efficient strategy because
once those with a low threshold abandon FGC others are likely to follow.
More research is needed to identify the distribution of thresholds in communities
in which FGC is practiced. Additionally, little research has been done that rigorously
identifies the impact of policies aimed at reducing FGC. Camilotti (2015a,b) shows that
one NGO’s programs have had a small effect in the reduction of FGC and that laws that
ban FGC have had an adverse effect—namely households are cutting their daughters at
an earlier age. More studies are needed to show the impacts of interventions aimed at
curbing FGC and how these interventions interact with the distribution of household
thresholds.
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Chapter 4
Change of Heart: Explaining
Shifting Opinions of Female
Genital Cutting in West Africa∗
4.1 Introduction
Female Genital Gutting (FGC),1 is a practice in which a woman’s genitalia are partially
or totally removed for non-medical reasons. Undergoing FGC can have serious physical
and psychological health consequences including increased risk for birthing complications
(Jones et al., 1999), sexually transmitted diseases (Wagner, 2015), as well as anxiety, post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and memory loss (Behrendt and Moritz, 2005). Women
who have undergone FGC are also more likely to experience depression, chronic irritability,
frigidity, and marital conflict (Dorkenoo, 1999). Such physical and psychological health
complications have been shown to have real impacts on educational attainment and
labor market outcomes. Psychiatric disorders are correlated with dropping out of school
(Kessler et al., 1995) and PTSD is related to unemployment (Savoca and Rosenheck,
2000). Severe PTSD symptoms are associated with worse labor market outcomes (Smith
∗This chapter was written in collaboration with Marie Baguet, Department of Economics, University
of Cergy-Pontoise.
1Female genital cutting (FGC) is also referred to as “female circumcision” and “female genital
mutilation”. Throughout this article we use the terminology FGC, “cut,” and “cutting” interchangeably.
82
et al., 2005). These potential education and labor market consequences suggest that
FGC can contribute to economic underdevelopment in communities in which the practice
is prevalent.
Even when faced with the health complications associated with FGC, many families
choose to cut their daughters. This decision is often a response to the social expectations
placed on families and girls. Indeed, in the 13 West African countries that we study,
FGC is correlated with an increased likelihood of marriage (Wagner, 2015), and FGC is
often viewed as a rite of passage for girls (Toubia and Sharief, 2003) and a way for them
to join the society of women. There are, however, some families that choose to abandon
FGC even when constrained by these social expectations. In this chapter, we examine
which families are most likely to perpetuate the practice of FGC—proxied for here by a
woman’s stated support for the continuation of the practice of FGC—and which families
are most likely to abandon it.
Bellemare et al. (2015) show that despite the social importance of FGC, 87% of the
variation in a woman’s support for FGC is explained by individual- and household-level
characteristics rather than village or region characteristics. In countries in which the
rate of FGC is high, individual factors explain a larger share of the support for FGC
than in countries in which the rate of FGC is lower (Bellemare et al., 2015). Further,
Novak (2017) shows that households have heterogeneous preferences for FGC. She shows
that when faced with the same rate of FGC within their community, some households
will choose to cut their daughter and others will not.
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and governments have created campaigns
to inform individuals of the risks associated with FGC in order to reduce the prevalence
of the practice. For these organizations, it is important to know which individuals
and households should be targeted by their interventions. If an organization wishes to
achieve the greatest decrease in the rate of FGC in the shortest amount of time, these
organizations may wish to target individuals who are the most likely to abandon the
practice. Organizations may instead wish to target the hardest to reach in order to
promote equity. Depending on the distribution of preferences within the community,
targeting the hardest to reach could induce a cascade effect if a tipping point in the
rate of FGC exists in the community (Novak, 2017; Efferson et al., 2015; Platteau et al.,
2017).
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While much research has been conducted regarding how FGC emerged and evolved
into a common practice (Mackie, 1996; Shell-Duncan and Hernlund, 2006) as well as
its immediate and long term effects (Wagner, 2015; Jones et al., 1999; Dorkenoo, 1999),
insufficient research has focused on the social and economic characteristics of women
who are less likely to support the perpetuation of FGC, despite being born and raised
in an environment that valued this practice. It is crucial to understand who is likely
to be a leader in the abandonment of the practice and who is likely to hold on to the
tradition. We focus on the opinions of women because women are often the primary
decision makers regarding whether their daughters or granddaughters will undergo FGC
(Toubia and Sharief, 2003; Shell-Duncan and Hernlund, 2001). We use data from 13
West African countries that include women aged 15 to 49 at the time of survey to explore
this question.
The contribution of this chapter is twofold. First, Wagner (2015) shows that higher
educational attainment is associated with a reduced likelihood that the woman herself
has undergone FGC. It was unclear, however, if cut women who are also educated are
less likely to support the continuation of the practice. We find that educated women are
less likely to support the practice of cutting only in countries where the prevalence of
FGC is moderate or high (more than 35 percent of adult women).
Second, we systematically study the role of religion. There is no religion that
mandates or even directly encourages FGC (Mackie, 1996). In Senegal and The Gambia,
many respondents perceive FGC as a matter of tradition, rather than religion (Shell-
Duncan and Hernlund, 2006). Nevertheless, Islamic rituals and priorities—washing and
cleanliness—may indirectly legitimize FGC since uncut women are considered “unclean”
in many communities. Additionally FGC is a way for women to signal their piety and
thus gain respect in many religious cultures. Shell-Duncan and Hernlund (2006) conclude
that women who view FGC as a part of their religious practice are less likely to be
willing to abandon FGC. We investigate the relationship between religious affiliation and
support for FGC. We find that Muslim women are more likely than Christian women
to support FGC in 7 out of our 13 included countries. Atheist, animists, and other
religiously affiliated women are more likely than Christian women to support FGC in 5
of our 13 included countries.
The strength of our approach comes from our use of data from 13 West African
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countries from multiple survey waves for each country. These countries and time periods
provide substantial heterogeneity in the prevalence and support for FGC, which allows
us to make broader conclusions than any one dataset would provide.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the data
and descriptive statistics. Section 4.3 explains the empirical framework we use to address
our question of interest. In section 4.4 we present the results, and in section 4.5 we
interpret the results and conclude.
4.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Female genital cutting is practiced in parts of Africa, the Middle East, and Asia as well
as among some immigrant communities in the United States, Canada, and Europe. We
study West Africa because the variation in prevalence rates of FGC across and within
countries as well as the heterogeneity in the rate of decline of FGC makes it an ideal
place to study the persistence of the practice. Figure 4.1 shows the heterogeneity in the
rates of FGC among adult women in African and Middle Eastern countries.
We use publicly available, nationally representative data sets from USAID’s Demo-
graphic and Health Survey (DHS) program and UNICEF’s Multiple Indicator Cluster
Survey (MICS) program. These datasets include information about women aged 15 to
49 at the time of survey. Data are collected with similar methodologies for the DHS
and the MICS, making the datasets comparable across countries and time. We use
23 cross-sectional datasets from 13 West African countries.2 The data were collected
between the years 2005 and 2013. Table 4.1 shows the countries and the dates of the
surveys included in our analysis.
Some governments have enacted bans in order to curb the prevalence of FGC. Column
2 of table 4.1 shows the year a ban was enacted or expanded in each country. A larger
discussion about the effect of a ban on misreporting can be found in subsection 4.3.2.
2Cape Verde (DHS, 2005) and Liberia (MICS, 2007) are not included in our analysis because the
data do not include questions regarding whether the respondent has undergone FGC
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Figure 4.1: Percentage of girls and women aged 15 to 49 years who have undergone FGC
Source: UNICEF 2013
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Table 4.1: Datasets
Country Datasets Year of Ban
Benin DHS: 2006, 2011-2012 2003
Burkina Faso DHS: 2003, 2010 1996
Coˆte d’Ivoire DHS, 2011-2012 1998
Gambia MICS: 2005, 2010 2015
Ghana MICS: 2006, 2011 2007*
Guinea DHS: 2005, 2012 2000*
Guinea-Bissau MICS: 2006 2011
Mali DHS: 2006, 2012 -
Niger DHS: 2006 2003
Nigeria DHS: 2008, 2013 2015
Senegal DHS: 2005, 2010-2011 1999
Sierra Leone DHS: 2008, MICS: 2010 -
Togo MICS: 2006, 2010 1998
*The existing law was expanded
4.2.1 Attitudes Toward FGC
We study the intergenerational persistence of FGC—proxied for here by women who
have undergone FGC and who support the continuation of the practice. We restrict our
sample to women who have undergone FGC because these women are more likely to
have been raised in an environment in which individuals value FGC. Unfortunately, our
data do not systematically include information about whether a respondent’s daughters
have undergone FGC. Further, in some communities the practice is performed when a
girl is ready for marriage and may occur at a date that is too late for us to observe in
our data. Additionally, the father’s opinion of FGC is infrequently reported in our data.
Women are more likely than men to support FGC (Gage and Van Rossem, 2006), and
women are more often the decision makers regarding whether their daughter will undergo
FGC (Mackie, 1996; Toubia and Sharief, 2003). In fact Shell-Duncan and Hernlund
(2001) explain in their book that, “generally, women more actively perpetuate FGC
than do men. It is women’s business. It may be possible to concentrate initially on
women because if they are won over, they will persuade husbands, grandparents, and
religious and political figures.” Thus, while we would ideally have information on a
father’s attitudes toward FGC as well as on daughters’ FGC status, we argue that the
woman’s opinion is a good proxy for the household’s decision to cut it’s girls.
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Table 4.2 shows the rate of FGC in each country in our analysis, as well as the rate
of support for FGC among cut women. The rate of FGC is highest in Guinea where
over 97 percent of adult women have undergone FGC, and the rate is lowest in Niger
where less than 6 percent of women have undergone FGC. The highest rate of support
for FGC among cut women is in the Gambia followed by closely by Mali. The lowest
rate of support among cut women is in Togo and Burkina Faso. Burkina Faso has seen a
rapid decline in the rate of FGC which is consistent with the fact that the rate of FGC
is high but support for the practice is low among respondents.
Table 4.2: Rate of FGC and Rate of Support Among Cut Respondents
Rate of Rate of Support
Country FGC Among Cut Women
Benin 0.165 0.046
Burkina Faso 0.762 0.146
Coˆte d’Ivoire 0.446 0.452
The Gambia 0.777 0.880
Ghana 0.141 0.102
Guinea 0.974 0.792
Guinea-Bissau 0.483 0.616
Mali 0.886 0.870
Niger 0.055 0.188
Nigeria 0.420 0.437
Senegal 0.392 0.588
Sierra Leone 0.889 0.774
Togo 0.104 0.127
Sample: Married women aged 15 to 49.
Sources: Sources: Benin 2006, 2011; Burkina Faso 2003, 2010; Coˆte d’Ivoire
2006, 2011; The Gambia 2005, 2011; Ghana 2006, 2011; Guinea 2005, 2012;
Guinea-Bissau 2006; Mali 2006, 2012; Niger 2006; Nigeria 2008, 2013; Senegal
2005, 2010; Sierra Leone 2008, 2010; Togo 2006, 2010
We exclude from our analyses women who have not undergone FGC. If a woman did
not undergo FGC it is unlikely that she will choose to have her daughter undergo the
procedure, and it is uncommon that she will support the practice. Further, including
only women who have undergone FGC allows us to narrow the sample to women who are
comparable in terms of their cultural upbringing and who are more likely to perpetuate
the practice.
88
We exclude never married women from our sample since married or previously
married women are more likely to already have children or be thinking about about
having children. These women are more likely to have given some thought to whether
their daughter(s) will undergo FGC. Additionally, never married women are 27 percentage
points more likely to underreport their support for FGC than are ever married women
(De Cao and Lutz, 2015).
4.2.2 Determinants of FGC Support
The previous subsection described our outcome of interest and our sample of women. In
this section we describe the main socioeconomic characteristics that are hypothesized to
be correlated with FGC in the literature, as well as why we include them in our analysis.
Table 4.3 show the descriptive statistics for these variables.
Education
We investigate the relationship between education and support for FGC. The literature
has not established a causal relationship between education and FGC, though Wagner
(2015) found that educated women are significantly less likely to have undergone FGC
themselves in the 13 West African countries that we study. We are interested in whether
education is correlated with a reduced likelihood of supporting the practice and thus a
reduced likelihood that an educated woman’s daughter will undergo FGC. In Egypt an
increase in mothers’ education is associated with a reduction in the likelihood that her
daughter will undergo FGC (Modrek and Liu, 2013). Education may be associated with
a reduction in support for FGC if, for example, educated women are more aware of the
harmful health effects of FGC and are thus less likely to support the continuation of the
practice. Additionally, Mackie (1996) suggests that FGC is a premarital investment that
increases and improves marriage opportunities. If FGC and education are substitutes
on the marriage market, an educated woman’s child (who is then also more likely to be
educated) may rely less heavily on FGC to guarantee marriage.
We break education into four categories: (i) no formal education, (ii) at least some
primary education, (iii) at least some secondary education, (iv) more than secondary
education (“higher education”). We use level of education rather than years of education
as we expect this categorization to be less sensitive to misreporting. A woman is more
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Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics
Benin Burkina Coˆte Gambia Ghana Guinea Guinea Mali Niger Nigeria Senegal Sierra Togo
Faso d’Ivoire Bissau Leone
Education: None 0.908 0.816 0.818 0.809 0.824 0.819 0.785 0.779 0.817 0.240 0.723 0.750 0.816
(0.005) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.015) (0.004) (0.010) (0.006) (0.039) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.014)
Primary 0.066 0.121 0.131 0.076 0.107 0.095 0.162 0.107 0.119 0.284 0.210 0.109 0.142
(0.005) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.012) (0.003) (0.009) (0.004) (0.033) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.013)
Secondary 0.026 0.062 0.047 0.108 0.068 0.074 0.052 0.108 0.064 0.363 0.066 0.125 0.040
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.009) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.025) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007)
Higher 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.008 0.001 0.012 0.001 0.007 0.000 0.113 0.001 0.017 0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002)
Religion: Christian 0.162 0.262 0.146 0.006 0.319 0.061 0.032 0.035 0.069 0.668 0.018 0.179 0.080
(0.007) (0.004) (0.009) (0.001) (0.019) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.017) (0.005) (0.002) (0.007) (0.009)
Muslim 0.748 0.620 0.678 0.993 0.632 0.920 0.928 0.935 0.906 0.308 0.978 0.821 0.721
(0.008) (0.004) (0.011) (0.001) (0.020) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.020) (0.005) (0.002) (0.007) (0.017)
Other 0.091 0.118 0.175 0.001 0.048 0.019 0.041 0.030 0.025 0.024 0.005 0.000 0.199
(0.005) (0.003) (0.009) (0.000) (0.009) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.015)
Age 32.672 32.094 31.945 30.118 36.169 31.749 30.714 30.147 32.160 34.729 30.302 32.692 34.813
(0.149) (0.081) (0.198) (0.090) (0.314) (0.098) (0.208) (0.105) (0.786) (0.091) (0.117) (0.130) (0.298)
Polygamous: No 0.475 0.531 0.527 0.359 0.498 0.468 0.479 0.607 0.578 0.656 0.563 0.567 0.406
(0.009) (0.005) (0.012) (0.005) (0.020) (0.005) (0.012) (0.006) (0.048) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.019)
Yes 0.478 0.418 0.410 0.315 0.429 0.480 0.442 0.350 0.353 0.257 0.361 0.327 0.536
(0.009) (0.005) (0.012) (0.005) (0.019) (0.005) (0.012) (0.006) (0.047) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.019)
Unspecified 0.048 0.051 0.063 0.327 0.073 0.052 0.079 0.043 0.070 0.087 0.076 0.106 0.058
(0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.010) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.022) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.009)
Wealth Index -3.270 0.357 -0.020 0.233 -0.635 -0.539 0.018 4.820 4.490 2.596 -2.235 -0.015 -0.120
(0.124) (0.101) (0.197) (0.009) (0.025) (0.102) (0.019) (0.524) (1.425) (0.094) (0.112) (0.020) (0.017)
Survey Year 1 0.616 0.426 1.000 0.295 0.164 0.416 1.000 0.614 1.000 0.363 0.431 0.439 0.551
(0.009) (0.005) (0.000) (0.004) (0.012) (0.005) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.020)
Survey Year 2 0.384 0.574 0.705 0.836 0.584 0.386 0.637 0.569 0.561 0.449
(0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.012) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.020)
Observations 3,274 17,818 3,110 13,703 929 12,164 2,332 16,985 173 12,036 8,147 11,519 835
Standard deviations in parentheses. Sample: Married women aged 15 to 49 at the time of survey who underwent FGC.
Sources: Benin 2006, 2011; Burkina Faso 2003, 2010; Coˆte d’Ivoire 2011; The Gambia 2005, 2011; Ghana 2006, 2011; Guinea 2005, 2012; Guinea-Bissau
2006; Mali 2006, 2012; Niger 2006; Nigeria 2008, 2013; Senegal 2005, 2010; Sierra Leone 2008, 2010; Togo 2006, 2010.
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likely to remember at what level she ceased her education than in which year she
completed her schooling. Table 4.3 shows that rates of education are very low among
our respondents. In Nigeria, 24 percent of respondents never attended school, while the
other 12 included countries 72 percent or more of respondents never attended school.
Religion
We are interested in the role of religion in the persistence of FGC. The practice of
FGC predates both Islam and Christianity, and there are no overt prescriptions to
practice FGC in either religion’s sacred texts (Mackie, 1996). Nevertheless some religious
observers believe that Islam mandates FGC. In Egypt there has been a sharper decline in
the prevalence FGC among Coptic Christian women than among Muslim women despite
comparable average levels of both education and wealth among Christians and Muslims
in the study area (Blaydes and Izama, 2015). As mentioned in section 4.1 Islamic rituals
may indirectly legitimize FGC, as uncircumcised women are considered “unclean,” and
FGC is a way for women to demonstrate their piety (Shell-Duncan and Hernlund, 2006).
In Senegal and the Gambia, many respondents feel that FGC is a matter of tradition
more so than a matter of religion, but Shell-Duncan and Hernlund (2006) conclude that
women who view FGC as part of their religious practice are less likely to abandon it.
We break religion into three possible categories: Christianity, which includes all
Protestant and Catholic sects; Islam; and other religions, which includes animists,
atheists, and “spiritual” beliefs. Muslims comprise the majority of our respondents in
all countries except Nigeria, where Christianity is the predominate religion.
Age
We include the age of the respondent at the time of survey in our analysis. Older women
who have undergone FGC often play the role of “gatekeepers” in its perpetuation (Coyne
and Coyne, 2014). In the Gambia female elders perpetuate FGC to assert their influence
and social position in the community (Ahmadu, 2005). FGC works as a signal that
a woman who underwent FGC respects the authority of the older cut women in her
community. The practice facilitates the accumulation of social capital for younger women
and increases influence and prestige for elder women. Further, FGC procedures are
often performed by a traditional circumciser, who is typically an older women in the
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community (Shell-Duncan and Hernlund, 2001). For these older women the end of FGC
would represent both a financial and social loss.
Additionally, Shell-Duncan and Hernlund (2006) find that in Senegal and the Gambia
the persistence of FGC is not driven by marriageability concerns and instead find strong
evidence that FGC is a peer convention. Thus, a woman’s peer group may be an
important determinant of her beliefs about FGC.
Polygamy
Mackie (1996) suggests that FGC first emerged in polygamous unions, since men in
a polygamous union have less control over their wives’ behavior and thus a higher
incentive to control their wives sexuality because they want to ensure the paternity
of their children. Thus, a polygamous man may be more likely than a monogamous
man to require that his wives have undergone FGC. It is also possible that women in a
polygamous union are from more traditional households and may thus to be more likely
to support FGC. A woman in a polygamous union may also experience more pressure
from her cowives to adhere to social norms and traditions.
We include a categorial variable specifying if the respondent (i) is in a monogamous
union, (ii) is in a polygamous union, or (iii) did not specify the type of her marital union.
Wealth
The relationship between support for FGC and wealth is unclear. The practice of FGC
started among elite families (Mackie, 1996), so one could expect wealthier households to
have an attachment to the practice. In Sierra Leone, for example, FGC is practiced in an
all-female secret society called the Bondo society (also known as the Sande society), and
the cost of initiation, including FGC, is expensive (approximately 100 USD). Members
of the Bondo society have higher social standing than other women, and undergoing
FGC thus allow girls to signal the wealth of their family (Mgbako et al., 2010).
Alternatively, if family wealth and FGC are substitutes on the marriage market or
substitutes for gaining respect among community members, then girls from wealthy
families may not need to signal additional quality on the marriage market or in the
community whereas girls from poor families need to compensate for their lack of family
wealth.
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We include a wealth index in our regressions. This wealth index is provided in the
DHS and MICS datasets. It is computed using principal component analysis of household
possessions including a radio, television, mobile telephone, and bicycle. The wealth index
provides a ranking of households’ wealth within a country-year.
Ethnicity
The rate of FGC within a woman’s community explains an important amount of her
preference for FGC, and communities are often delineated by ethnic group (Novak, 2017).
The rate of FGC varies substantially between ethnic groups across Sub-Saharan Africa
(Yoder et al., 2004). Including ethnicity fixed effects allows us to control for shared
norms which affect the value placed on FGC by the respondent. The number of ethnic
groups reported in a country ranges between 7 and 19. In the interest of brevity, we
do not report the estimated coefficients for each ethnic group, but they are available
from the authors upon request. Additionally, since many ethnic groups are represented
in only a few countries, cross-country comparisons of ethnic groups are not feasible or
particularly interesting.
Village
We include village fixed effects in our regressions in order to account for a large amount
of the time-invariant characteristics of a woman’s surroundings that might influence
her opinion of FGC. For example, individuals living in rural communities often have
more limited interactions with individuals from other cultural groups in comparison
to individuals living in urban areas. This relative isolation can foster more traditional
views which could include support for FGC. Village fixed effects account for the average
level of social costs of deviating from the norm of FGC perceived within a village.
Village fixed effects also control for time-invariant access to labor market and educational
opportunities available to women, which could influence their support for FGC.
Survey Year
There has been much international and domestic attention paid to the practice of FGC
in recent years. These campaigns could have instigated some change the perceptions of
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FGC. Additionally, as shown in table 4.1, some countries in our dataset instituted a ban
on FGC in or between the years for which we have data. We included survey year fixed
effects in order to account for country-level changes in the perception of FGC between
survey waves.
Interviewer
Lastly, the interviewer and the way in which she conducts the interview could influence
the responses of the respondent, particularly on a subject as personal as FGC. We
include interviewer fixed effects in our regressions.
4.3 Estimation
4.3.1 Estimation Strategy
We investigate which characteristics of cut women predict their likelihood to support
the continuation of FGC. For each of the 13 countries in our dataset we estimate the
following regression for ever married women who report having undergone FGC:
yivt = β0 + xivtβ1 + dvβ2 + dtβ3 + deβ4 + ivt (4.1)
where subscripts denote individual i in village v surveyed at a time t. Let yivt equal 1
if the respondent supports the continuation of FGC and 0 otherwise. Let xivt denote
the vector of control variables,3 which are: level of education of the respondent, her
religion, her at the time of survey, age squared, her type of marital union, wealth index
for the household in which she lives, and her ethnic group. Let dv be a vector of village
fixed-effects, dt is a vector of survey year fixed-effects, de is a vector of interviewer
fixed-effects, and ivt is an error term with mean zero.
We estimate equation 4.1 using ordinary least squares (OLS). Because our outcome
variable is binary, the use of OLS means that we are estimating linear probability models
(LPM). Our use of LPM, instead of logit or probit models, follows the recommendations
of Angrist and Pischke (2008). LPMs handle a large number of fixed effects much better
3Boldface is used to indicated vectors.
94
than logit and probit models due to the incidental parameter problem (Greene et al.,
2002).
4.3.2 Misreporting
Our goal is to show which women are likely to have positive opinions of FGC in order
to help policy makers better target their interventions. It is important to consider the
possibility that a respondent will misreport her FGC status or her support for FGC—that
is, report that she does not support the continuation of FGC when in fact she does
support it. Misreporting may occur since FGC can be a sensitive topic and FGC is
banned in some included countries (see table 4.1). There is much heterogeneity in the
extent and enforcement of national laws against FGC, and the effects of these laws are
unclear. Nevertheless, misreporting in response to these law is possible.
First, consider the possibility that a woman misreports her own FGC status. It is
possible that a woman would falsely report that she has undergone FGC when in fact
she has not. This side of misreporting is less likely due to the current international and
domestic climate toward FGC in the majority of our included countries. It is more likely
that there are false negatives, that is women who state that they have not undergone
FGC when in fact they have. Because these women report that they have not undergone
FGC, they are dropped from our regressions entirely. If these women, on average, have
the same level of support as women who correctly report that they have undergone FGC
our estimates will not be effected. If instead women who falsely state that they have
not been cut have a different level of support for FGC than true positives and if their
propensity to support is correlated with their observable characteristics, our estimates
on included characteristics will be biased. The direction of that bias depends both on
the characteristics of the false negatives and the difference in propensity to support FGC.
Ideally, we would have information from gynecological exams of the respondents. In
lieu of this information, we use reported FGC status and discuss the extent of possible
misreporting.
Huntington et al. (1996) show that in their study conducted in Egypt, 94 percent of
gynecological examinations revealed the same information as self-reports. It is important
to note that no ban was enacted in Egypt at the time of the study. According to Novak
(2017), DHS data from Burkina Faso have an average rate of FGC that is similar to the
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rate of FGC calculated using gynecological exams in Jones et al. (1999). Klouman et al.
(2005) find that in Tanzania 66 percent of women self-report that they underwent FGC,
while medical exams revealed that 73 percent of these women had undergone FGC. The
authors argue that women who were “minimally” cut at an early age might be unaware
of their FGC status. Elmusharaf et al. (2006) find misreporting regarding type FGC the
respondent had undergone (excision versus infibulation) but no misreporting for overall
FGC status in Sudan. In this chapter we will not differentiate between the various types
of FGC, we will only use the fact that a woman reports her FGC status. This eliminates
some of the potential misreporting errors.
It is also possible that women misreport their support for FGC. If, for example,
Christian women are more likely to falsely report that they do not support FGC, the
coefficient on Muslims (as compared to Christians) might be biased upward in absolute
value. Additionally, if educated women are more likely to know about the laws and
media campaigns discouraging FGC, these women might be more likely to believe that
their interviewer is against the practice and falsely report that they do not support
FGC in order to please the interviewer. This would bias upward (in absolute value) the
association between support for FGC and education. In fact, in Ethiopia a decade after
the enactment of a ban against FGC, uneducated women were 16 percentage points
more likely to falsely report that they did not support the continuation of FGC than
were educated women (De Cao and Lutz, 2015).4 If this finding holds in all countries
that we study, our estimates on education would be an underestimate of the association
with support for FGC.
4.4 Results
We pool cross-sections from multiple survey rounds within a country, where available,
and report the pooled results. Our sample includes ever married women who report
having undergone FGC. Table 4.4 presents the results from our estimation of equation
4.1.
Table 4.4 shows that in the majority of countries, education is negatively and
4De Cao and Lutz (2015) use a list experiment in addition to direct questioning about support for
FGC in order to measure the potential bias that arises when women are directly asked about their
support for FGC.
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Table 4.4: LPM estimation results for whether respondent thinks FGC should continue
Dependent variable = 1 if respondent reports supporting FGC, 0 otherwise
Benin Burkina Coˆte Gambia Ghana Guinea Guinea Mali Niger Nigeria Senegal Sierra Togo
Faso d’Ivoire Bissau Leone
Level of Support 0.046 0.146 0.452 0.880 0.102 0.792 0.616 0.870 0.188 0.437 0.588 0.774 0.127
Education [Omitted: No Formal School]
Primary 0.011 -0.017** -0.081*** -0.038*** 0.050 -0.044*** -0.210*** -0.035* -0.077 -0.013 -0.074*** -0.030 0.043
(0.016) (0.009) (0.027) (0.013) (0.068) (0.015) (0.031) (0.020) (0.134) (0.016) (0.019) (0.030) (0.044)
Secondary -0.019 -0.046*** -0.128*** -0.114*** -0.004 -0.184*** -0.311*** -0.153*** -0.089 -0.046*** -0.243*** -0.166*** -0.020
(0.015) (0.013) (0.034) (0.017) (0.056) (0.023) (0.060) (0.022) (0.240) (0.017) (0.030) (0.036) (0.034)
Higher -0.051* -0.244*** -0.318*** -0.063 -0.382*** -0.251 -0.289*** -0.104*** -0.444*** -0.318*** -0.029
(0.028) (0.060) (0.057) (0.081) (0.043) (0.364) (0.055) (0.024) (0.106) (0.098) (0.083)
Religion [Omitted: Christian]
Muslim -0.008 0.017* 0.073* 0.054 -0.074 0.113** 0.195** 0.223*** 0.036 0.109*** 0.021 0.092*** -0.016
(0.010) (0.009) (0.038) (0.065) (0.065) (0.045) (0.093) (0.044) (0.224) (0.025) (0.067) (0.026) (0.117)
Other 0.017 0.075*** 0.126*** 0.068 0.084 0.111*** 0.104 0.202*** 0.282 0.279*** -0.062 0.036 -0.032
(0.018) (0.016) (0.040) (0.084) (0.093) (0.030) (0.087) (0.049) (0.256) (0.033) (0.139) (0.079) (0.089)
Age 0.003 -0.014*** -0.024*** -0.000 -0.028 -0.003 0.010 -0.009** 0.020 -0.012** -0.015*** -0.005 -0.043***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.009) (0.003) (0.023) (0.003) (0.011) (0.003) (0.037) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.016)
Age Squared -0.000 0.000*** 0.000** -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000** -0.000 0.000** 0.000** 0.000 0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Polygamous -0.005 -0.004 0.007 -0.007 -0.019 0.017* -0.050* 0.004 0.007 0.034** 0.025* 0.031** 0.021
(0.009) (0.007) (0.027) (0.012) (0.038) (0.009) (0.029) (0.012) (0.114) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.033)
Wealth Index -0.001 -0.001** -0.005** 0.012 0.010 -0.003** -0.092*** -0.000 -0.002 -0.003*** -0.002* -0.042*** -0.005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.009) (0.062) (0.001) (0.028) (0.000) (0.018) (0.001) (0.001) (0.015) (0.058)
Constant -0.065 0.408*** 0.403 1.095*** 0.595 0.870*** 0.398 0.763*** -0.359 0.727*** 0.694*** 0.817*** 0.943***
(0.072) (0.066) (0.341) (0.108) (0.467) (0.085) (0.284) (0.091) (0.550) (0.228) (0.140) (0.129) (0.325)
Observations 3,274 17,818 3,110 13,703 929 12,164 2,332 16,985 173 12,036 8,147 11,519 835
R-squared 0.437 0.229 0.362 0.261 0.357 0.241 0.433 0.274 0.640 0.349 0.307 0.329 0.564
Standard errors clustered at the village level shown in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample: Married women aged 15 to 49 at the time of survey who
underwent FGC. Controls included: Ethnicity, village, interviewer, and survey year fixed effects.
Sources: Benin 2006, 2011; Burkina Faso 2003, 2010; Coˆte d’Ivoire 2011; The Gambia 2005, 2011; Ghana 2006, 2011; Guinea 2005, 2012; Guinea-Bissau 2006; Mali 2006,
2012; Niger 2006; Nigeria 2008, 2013; Senegal 2005, 2010; Sierra Leone 2008, 2010; Togo 2006, 2010.97
significantly associated with support for FGC. Further, the likelihood of supporting
FGC is decreasing in the level of education. In Coˆte d’Ivoire, for example, a woman
who attended primary school is 8.1 percentage points less likely to support FGC than
a similar woman who attended no formal school. A women who attended secondary
school or higher education is 12.8 and 24.2 percentage points, respectively, less likely
to support FGC than a woman who attended no formal schooling. There are four
countries—Benin, Ghana, Niger, and Togo—in which there is no statistically significant
relationship between education and support for FGC. These countries have four of the
five lowest rates of support for FGC among cut women, which could contribute the lack
of a relationship between a woman’s characteristics and her support for FGC.
Muslims are more likely than Christians to support the continuation of FGC. The
magnitude of this difference ranges between (a statistical) 0 and a 22.3 percentage
points increased likelihood of support. In three countries—Burkina Faso, Coˆte d’Ivoire,
and Nigeria—the “other” religious groups have a higher likelihood of support than
both Christians or Muslims. This category varies in composition between countries but
typically includes animists and non-religious groups. There is no statistical relationship
between religion and support for FGC in Benin, the Gambia, Ghana, Niger, Senegal,
and Togo. In four of those countries, this lack of statistical relationship is likely due
to the lack of variation in reported support for FGC. In the Gambia and Senegal this
lack of relationship likely comes from the fact that respondents in these countries are
overwhelmingly Muslim (96 percent in both cases).
A woman in a polygamous union is more likely to support FGC than a woman in a
monogamous union in 4 of the 13 countries that we study. In Guinea-Bissau a woman in
a polygamous union is five percentage points less likely to support FGC than a woman
in a monogamous union. This suggests that in some cases women in polygamous unions
are more traditional and are more likely to favor traditional practices.
Wealthy women are statistically less likely to support FGC in 7 of the 13 countries we
study. This suggests that there has been a shift in the demographics of those who practice
FGC since the practice first began among wealthy women, and this lends credence to
the substitution hypothesis. That is, it is possible that household wealth compensates
for the need to undergo FGC in order to ensure acceptance into the community and
marriage for a daughter.
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4.4.1 Limitations
We discussed the limitations of using direct reports of a woman’s FGC status and
her support for FGC in section 4.3.2. Ideally we would have data from gynecological
exams in order to verify FGC status and we would elicit opinions of FGC via less direct
questioning. Our true outcome of interest is whether a woman’s daughter undergoes
FGC. Unfortunately a woman’s daughter’s FGC status is infrequently reported in our
datasets.
Our sample is restricted to women aged 15 for 49 at the time of survey. Older women
are often important players in a family’s decision of whether to cut its daughter. Men’s
opinions about FGC may also be influential. While we have information about a very
important subgroup of the population regarding the decisions surrounding FGC, we have
an incomplete picture of the decision makers.
Our estimates provide evidence of associations between a woman’s characteristics
and her support for FGC, but do not provide causal estimates. These results should
guide policy makers wishing to most efficiently target their interventions, but our results
do not provide evidence regarding the causal effect of such interventions. Future research
should be conducted to address these limitations.
4.5 Discussion and Conclusions
Using data from 13 West African countries, we investigated which characteristics of
women best predict their support for FGC. In particular, we are interested in whether
education, religion, age, polygamy status, wealth, and ethnicity are correlated with a
woman’s stated support for the continuation of the practice of FGC. We find that in 9 of
the 13 countries, a more educated woman is statistically and economically significantly
less likely to support FGC. The rate of FGC is moderate or high (above 35 percent) in
each of these 9 countries. Muslim women are more likely to support FGC than Christian
women in 7 of the 13 included countries. In each of these seven countries, 42 percent or
more of adult women have undergone FGC. Animists, atheists, and women ascribing
to other religions are more likely than Christian women to support FGC in 5 of the
13 included countries. A polygamous woman is more likely to support FGC in four of
our included countries, though the estimated relationships are relatively small. The
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likelihood of support is decreasing in wealth in 7 of the 13 included countries.
Novak (2017) showed that households have heterogenous preferences for FGC and are
willing to deviate from the norm at different observed rates of cutting in their community.
The results derived in this chapter provide clearer direction for policy makers as they are
targeting their interventions. Specifically, if a policy maker wishes to target the women
who are most willing to deviate from practicing FGC, they should, on average, target
educated, wealthy, Christian women. Alternatively, policy makers wishing to change
the opinions of the hardest to reach should consider directing their interventions toward
women who are Muslim, animist, or atheist and who have no formal education.
The strength of our approach comes from the vast amount of data from these 13
countries over multiple time periods. This allows us to draw more substantive conclusions
than any one dataset, or multiple datasets from just one country, would allow. This is
particularly important when discussing a practice like FGC which varies widely between
communities, and results from one country may not apply to another.
Future research should investigate the causal effect of these variables on support and
perpetuation of FGC. Researchers should also explore creative ways to avoid relying on
direct reporting of own FGC status, daughter’s FGC status, and support for FGC.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
Female genital cutting (FGC) is practiced in parts of Africa, the Middle East, and Asia.
The practice has existed for at least 3,000 years (Mackie, 1996) and persists despite the
numerous health complications associated with the procedure. In this dissertation, I
have investigated why the practice is perpetuated across generations. Using data from 13
West African countries that were collected between 1995 and 2013 I test the prevailing
theory regarding why FGC persists—that is, that FGC is a social coordination norm
(Mackie, 1996). My coauthors and I show that this theory is not consistent with empirical
evidence from West Africa. Specifically, the social coordination norm theory predicts that
a substantial proportion of the variation in the persistence of FGC should be explained
at the community level. We find that, on average, 87 percent of the variation in the
persistence of FGC is explained by individual and household level factors. Further,
individual factors explain a larger share of the persistence of FGC in countries in which
the practice is more widespread.
Based on these findings, and similar findings by Efferson et al. (2015) in Sudan,
there was a need for a new theory regarding why FGC persists. In my second essay, I
generate a new theoretical explanation for the persistence of the practice. I show that if
households have heterogeneous thresholds for FGC, such that each household requires a
different proportion of their community to abandon FGC before they will also agree to
abandon the practice, then a tipping point in the rate of FGC is not guaranteed and
a community may have a stable interior equilibrium in the rate of FGC. Using data
from Burkina Faso, I show that the distribution of household thresholds vary widely
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between communities. Some communities have a tipping point in the rate of FGC, and
that tipping point has already been reached. In these communities, FGC should be
eliminated. Other communities have stable internal equilibrium in the rate of FGC. The
rate of FGC is likely to remain constant until an external stimulus (such as an effective
anti-FGC campaign) alters household behavior and thus the rate of FGC.
In order for public policy interventions to be most effectively targeted, my coauthor
and I investigate which characteristics of women best predict their likelihood to support
or oppose FGC. I find that in countries in which 35 percent or more of adult women have
undergone FGC, educated women are less likely than uneducated women to support
FGC and Christian women are less likely than Muslim or animist women to support the
continuation of FGC. These findings will aid policy makers in finding the most relevant
group at which to aim their interventions.
A major strength of the approach in these chapters comes from the breadth of the
data used in the analyses. Using data from 13 West African countries spanning almost
two decades allows me to draw much broader and far reaching conclusions than any one
dataset would allow. The data provide sufficient variation in respondent’s FGC status,
daughter’s FGC status, and reported support for the practice to identify meaningful
relationships with their characteristics.
Nevertheless, the countries used in these analyses are only a subset of the countries in
which FGC is practiced. Norms surrounding FGC vary widely and it is important to be
prudent in applying findings from West Africa to other parts of the world. Additionally,
the use of direct reports of a woman’s FGC status, her daughter’s FGC status, and her
support for FGC leaves room for misreporting. Future research should aim to include
data from gynecological exams in order to verify FGC status and elicit opinions of FGC
via less direct questioning.
Additionally, the samples are restricted to women aged 15 for 49 at the time of
survey. Older women and men may play an important role in the decision to perpetuate
FGC. Unfortunately we do not have information regarding the opinions of the full roster
of those involved in the decision to cut a girl nor do we have information about the
intrahousehold bargaining process. In the future, researchers should prioritize collecting
data about other decision makers.
The findings in this dissertation suggest that the community plays an important
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role in an individual’s (or household’s) decision regarding whether to cut her daughter.
Nevertheless, their actions are not fully determined by their community. This suggests
that policy makers should design interventions that increase a household’s perceived costs
of FGC (e.g., by explaining the adverse health effects) or decrease the perceived benefits.
Policy makers should pay special attention to the targeting of these interventions. If a
community has a distribution of household thresholds such that a tipping point exists,
it may be most efficient to target those with the highest thresholds—i.e., those most
willing to abandon FGC. Alternatively, if a stable equilibrium exists in the rate of FGC,
targeting those with the lowest thresholds and changing their perceived cost-benefit ratio
of practicing FGC may be necessary. Future research should prioritize evaluating such
interventions, while keeping both the design of the intervention and the targeting of that
intervention prominently in mind.
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Appendix A
Appendix—All in the Family
A.1 Sampling Scheme
Benin 2001: Of the 6,206 households selected for the survey, 5,945 were occupied, and
5,769 were successfully interviewed. In the interviewed households, 6,448 women aged
15 to 49 were identified, and 6,219 were successfully interviewed for a response rate of
96.4%.
Benin 2006: Of the 17,982 households selected for the survey, 17,675 were occupied,
and 17,511 were successfully interviewed. In the interviewed households, 18,851 women
aged 15 to 49 were identified, and 17,794 were successfully interviewed for a response
rate of 94.4%.
Benin 2011: Of the 17,999 households selected for the survey, 17,672 were occupied,
and 17,422 were successfully interviewed. In the interviewed households, 17,329 women
aged 15 to 49 were identified, and 16,599 were successfully interviewed for a response
rate of 95.8%.
Burkina Faso 1998: Of the 4,910 households selected for the survey, 4,812 were
successfully interviewed. In the interviewed households, 6,742 women aged 15 to 49 were
identified, and 6,445 were successfully interviewed for a response rate of 95.6%.
Burkina Faso 2003: Of the 9,470 households selected for the survey, 9,149 were
occupied, and 9,097 were successfully interviewed. In the interviewed households, 12,952
women aged 15 to 49 were identified, and 2,477 were successfully interviewed for a
response rate of 96.3%.
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Burkina Faso 2006: Of the 6,034 households selected for the survey, 5,954 were
occupied, and 5,523 were successfully interviewed. In the interviewed households, 8,159
women aged 15 to 49 were identified, and 7,316 were successfully interviewed for a
response rate of 89.7%.
Burkina Faso 2010: Of the 14,947 households selected for the survey, 14,536 were
occupied, and 14,424 were successfully interviewed. In the interviewed households, 17,363
women aged 15 to 49 were identified, and 17,087 were successfully interviewed for a
98.4% response rate.
Coˆte d’Ivoire 1998: Of the 2,302 households selected for the survey, 2,168 were
occupied, and 2,122 were successfully interviewed. In the interviewed households, 3,155
women aged 15 to 49 were identified, and 3,040 were successfully interviewed for a 96.4%
response rate.
Coˆte d’Ivoire 2006: Of the 7,600 households selected for the survey, 7,600 were
occupied, and 7,600 were successfully interviewed. In the interviewed households, 13,020
women aged 15 to 49 were identified, and 12,888 were successfully interviewed for a
99.0% response rate.
Coˆte d’Ivoire 2011: Of the 10,413 households selected for the survey, 9,873 were
occupied, and 9,686 were successfully interviewed. In the interviewed households, 10,848
women aged 15 to 49 were identified, and 10,060 were successfully interviewed for a
92.7% response rate.
Gambia 2005: Of the 6,175 households selected for the survey, 6,171 were occupied,
and 6,071 were successfully interviewed. In the interviewed households, 10,252 women
aged 15 to 49 were identified, and 9,982 were successfully interviewed for a 97.4% response
rate.
Gambia 2010: Of the 7,800 households selected for the sample, 7,799 households
were occupied, and 7,791 were successfully interviewed. In the interviewed households,
15,138 women aged 15-49 were identified, and 14,685 were successfully interviewed for a
response rate of 97.0%.
Ghana 2006: Of the 6,302 households selected for the sample, 6,264 were occupied,
and 5,939 were successfully interviewed. In the interviewed households, 6,240 women
aged 15 to 49 were identified, and 5,891 were successfully interviewed for a response rate
of 94.4%.
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Ghana 2011: Of the 12,150 households selected for the sample, 11,970 were occupied,
and 11,925 were successfully interviewed. In the households interviewed, 10,963 women
aged 15 to 49 years were identified, and 10,627 were successfully interviewed for a
response rate of 96.9%.
Guinea 1999: Of the 5,465 households selected for the sample, 5,216 were occupied,
and 5,090 were successfully interviewed. In the households interviewed, 7,117 women
aged 15 to 49 years were identified, and 6,753 were successfully interviewed for a response
rate of 94.9%.
Guinea 2005: Of the 6,480 households selected for the sample, 6,333 were occupied,
and 6,282 were successfully interviewed. In the households interviewed, 8,183 women
aged 15 to 49 years were identified, and 7,954 were successfully interviewed for a response
rate of 97.2%.
Guinea 2012: Of the 7,200 households selected for the sample, 7,148 were occupied,
and 7,109 were successfully interviewed. In the households interviewed, 9,331 women
aged 15 to 49 years were identified, and 9,142 were successfully interviewed for a response
rate of 98.0%.
Guinea-Bissau 2006: Of the 5,452 households selected for the sample, 5,448 were
occupied, and 5,305 were successfully interviewed. In the households interviewed, 9,904
women aged 15 to 49 years were identified, and 8,012 were successfully interviewed for a
response rate of 80.9%.
Mali 1995: Of the 9,512 households selected for the sample, 8,833 were occupied, and
8,716 were successfully interviewed. In the households interviewed, 10,096 women aged
15 to 49 years were identified, and 9,704 were successfully interviewed for a response
rate of 96.1%.
Mali 2001: Of the 13,717 households selected for the sample, 12,617 were occupied,
and 12,331 were successfully interviewed. In the households interviewed, 13,543 women
aged 15 to 49 years were identified, and 12,849 were successfully interviewed for a
response rate of 94.9%.
Mali 2006: Of the 13,695 households selected for the sample, 13,160 were occupied,
and 12,998 were successfully interviewed. In the households interviewed, 15,102 women
aged 15 to 49 years were identified, and 14,583 were successfully interviewed for a
response rate of 96.6%.
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Mali 2006: Of the 13,695 households selected for the sample, 13,160 were occupied,
and 12,998 were successfully interviewed. In the households interviewed, 15,102 women
aged 15 to 49 years were identified, and 14,583 were successfully interviewed for a
response rate of 96.6%.
Mali 2012: Of the 10,743 households selected for the sample, 10,265 were occupied,
and 10,105 were successfully interviewed. In the households interviewed, 10,875 women
aged 15 to 49 years were identified, and 10,424 were successfully interviewed for a
response rate of 95.9%.
Niger 1998: Of the 6,377 households selected for the sample, 6,007 were occupied,
and 5,928 were successfully interviewed. In the households interviewed, 7,863 women
aged 15 to 49 years were identified, and 7,577 were successfully interviewed for a response
rate of 96.4%.
Niger 2006: Of the 8,418 households selected for the sample, 7,824 were occupied,
and 7,660 were successfully interviewed. In the households interviewed, 9,646 women
aged 15 to 49 years were identified, and 9,223 were successfully interviewed for a response
rate of 95.6%.
Niger 2012: Of the 11,900 households selected for the sample, 10,969 were occupied,
and 10,750 were successfully interviewed. In the households interviewed, 11,698 women
aged 15 to 49 years were identified, and 11,160 were successfully interviewed for a
response rate of 95.4%.
Nigeria 1999: Of the 7,919 households selected for the sample, 7,736 were occupied,
and 7,647 were successfully interviewed. In the households interviewed, 8,918 women
aged 15 to 49 years were identified, and 8,199 were successfully interviewed for a response
rate of 91.9%.
Nigeria 2003: Of the 7,864 households selected for the sample, 7,327 were occupied,
and 7,225 were successfully interviewed. In the households interviewed, 7,985 women
aged 15 to 49 years were identified, and 7,620 were successfully interviewed for a response
rate of 95.4%.
Nigeria 2007: Of the 28,603 households selected for the sample, 28,431 were occupied,
and 26,735 were successfully interviewed. In the households interviewed, 27,093 women
aged 15 to 49 years were identified, and 24,565 were successfully interviewed for a
response rate of 90.7%.
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Nigeria 2008: Of the 36,298 households selected for the sample, 34,644 were occupied,
and 34,070 were successfully interviewed. In the households interviewed, 34,596 women
aged 15 to 49 years were identified, and 33,385 were successfully interviewed for a
response rate of 96.5%.
Nigeria 2011: Of the 29,343 households selected for the sample, 29,151 were occupied,
and 29,077 were successfully interviewed. In the households interviewed, 33,699 women
aged 15 to 49 years were identified, and 30,772 were successfully interviewed for a
response rate of 91.3%.
Nigeria 2013: Of the 40,320 households selected for the sample, 38,904 were occupied,
and 38,522 were successfully interviewed. In the households interviewed, 39,902 women
aged 15 to 49 years were identified, and 38,948 were successfully interviewed for a
response rate of 97.6%.
Senegal 2005: Of the 7,859 households selected for the sample, 7,528 were occupied,
and 7,412 were successfully interviewed. In the households interviewed, 15,587 women
aged 15 to 49 years were identified, and 14,602 were successfully interviewed for a
response rate of 93.7%.
Senegal 2010: Of the 8,212 households selected for the sample, 8,029 were occupied,
and 7,902 were successfully interviewed. In the households interviewed, 16,931 women
aged 15 to 49 years were identified, and 15,688 were successfully interviewed for a
response rate of 92.7%.
Sierra Leone 2005: Of the 8,000 households selected for the sample, 7,125 were
occupied, and 7,078 were successfully interviewed. In the households interviewed, 9,257
women aged 15 to 49 years were identified, and 7,654 were successfully interviewed for a
response rate of 82.1%.
Sierra Leone 2008: Of the 7,758 households selected for the sample, 7,461 were
occupied, and 7,284 were successfully interviewed. In the households interviewed, 7,845
women aged 15 to 49 years were identified, and 7,374 were successfully interviewed for a
response rate of 94.0%.
Sierra Leone 2010: Of the 11,923 households selected for the sample, 11,578 were
occupied, and 11,394 were successfully interviewed. In the households interviewed, 14,068
women aged 15 to 49 years were identified, and 13,359 were successfully interviewed for
a response rate of 95.0%.
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Togo 2006: Of the 6,600 households selected for the sample, 6,562 were occupied, and
6,492 were successfully interviewed. In the households interviewed, 6,713 women aged
15 to 49 years were identified, and 6,213 were successfully interviewed for a response
rate of 92.6%.
Togo 2010: Of the 6,975 households selected for the sample, 6,172 were occupied, and
6,039 were successfully interviewed. In the households interviewed, 7,016 women aged
15 to 49 years were identified, and 6,376 were successfully interviewed for a response
rate of 90.9%.
A.2 Irregularities in Included Datasets
Some country-years are missing variables used in the standard analysis. Namely, the
data set for Nigeria- 2012 does not include information on the religion of the respondent
nor the household head. Datasets for Niger-2012, Nigeria-1999 and -2003, and Sierra
Leone-2005 do not include information on ethnicity of the respondent nor the household
head. The dataset for Benin-2006 does not include information on whether or not a
household has access to electricity. Lastly, the datasets for Coˆte d’Ivoire-1998 and -2006
do not include information on the respondents partners age. This variable is used in the
alternative specification of our standard analysis. Additionally, the datasets for Coˆte
dIvoire-2006 and Nigeria-2011 do not include the names of some ethnic groups; these
groups are identified by a number. In these cases, ethnicity is included in the regressions,
but the descriptive tables identify these ethnicities as “Undisclosed Ethnicity.”
A.3 Differences in Included and Excluded Observations
Some observations are missing from the final sample due to missing data for one or
more variables included in the analysis. We explore whether there are systematic
differences between the observations included in and the observations that are missing
from each sample. For each estimation sample we run two regressions. First, we regress
a dummy equal to one if the outcome variable (i.e., the respondents support for the
continuation of FGC) is missing, and equal to zero otherwise, on age of the respondent,
ethnicity, and marital status, and we control for district-village-household fixed effects
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and interviewer fixed effects (because our most complete specification controls for those
levels of heterogeneity). We then run a similar regression in which the left hand side
variable is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the observation is missing data on
our variable of interest (i.e., the respondents FGC status), and equal to zero otherwise.
We then determine if the likelihood of response to the questions used for our dependent
variable and our variable of interest is different between the estimation sample and the
missing observations at any conventional level of significance.
For ease of exposition, let question 1 refer to the dependent variable, i.e., the question
regarding whether or not the respondent thinks the practice of FGC should continue.
Let “question 2” refer to the variable of interest, i.e., the question regarding the personal
FGC status of the respondent.
Benin 2001: There are 6,219 total observations and 3,709 are used. We find that older
and more educated women are more likely to question 1. Currently married women are
more likely than never married women to respond to question 1. There are no differences
in response rates to the question 2.
Benin 2006: There are 17,794 total observations and 10,390 are used. We find that
older and more educated women are more likely to respond to both questions.
Benin 2011: There are 16,599 total observations and 10,477 are used. We find that
older and more educated women are more likely to respond to both questions.
Burkina Faso 1998: There are 6,445 total observations and 4,736 are used. We find
that older and more educated women are more likely to respond to both questions.
Women who are currently separated from their partner are more likely than never
married women to respond to question 1.
Burkina Faso 2003: There are 12,477 total observations and 10,756 are used in the
analysis. We find that older and more educated women are more likely to respond both
questions. Women who are currently separated from their partner are more likely than
never married women to respond to question 1.
Burkina Faso 2006: There are 9,583 total observations and 6,264 are used in the
analysis. We find that more educated women are more likely to respond to both questions.
Women who are currently separated from their partner are more likely than never married
women to respond to question 1.
Burkina Faso 2010: There are 17,087 total observations and 16,595 are used. Older
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women are more likely to respond to the question 2. Divorced women are less likely than
never married women to respond question 2. There are no differences in response rates
to question 1.
Coˆte d’Ivoire 1998: There are 3,040 total observations and 2,517 are used in the
analysis. We find that older and more educated women are more likely to respond to
both questions.
Coˆte d’Ivoire 2006: There are 13,702 total observations and 9,971 are used in the
analysis. We find that older and more educated women are more likely to respond to
both questions. Women who are cohabitating with their partner are more likely to
respond to question 2.
Coˆte d’Ivoire 2011: There are 10,060 total observations and 8,731 are used. We
find that older and more educated women are more likely to respond to both questions.
Women who are currently cohabitating with their partner and divorced women are more
likely than never married women to respond to question 2.
The Gambia 2005: There are 11,340 total observations and 9,238 are used in the
analysis. We find that older women are more likely to respond to question 1. There is
no difference in response rates to question 2.
The Gambia 2010: There are 16,363 total observation and 13,101 are used. Women
with secondary education are more likely to respond question 1 than women with no
formal education. More educated women are more likely to respond to question 2.
Ghana 2006: There are 8,206 total observations and 4,084 are used in the analysis.
We find that older and more educated women are more likely to respond to both questions.
Women who are currently cohabitating with their partner are less likely than never
married women to respond to question 1.
Ghana 2011: There are 14,887 total observations and 4,181 observations are used.
Note that in Ghana many observations are dropped due to missing responses to the
question regarding whether or not FGC should continue. We find that older women are
more likely to respond to questions. Women that are cohabitating and never married
women are less likely than currently married women to respond question 1. Cohabitating
and divorced women are less likely than currently married women to respond to question
2.
Guinea 1999: There are 6,753 total observations and 5,905 are used in the analysis.
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There are no differences in response rates for either question.
Guinea 2005: There are 7,954 total observations and 6,707 are used in the analysis.
Older and more educated women are more likely to respond to question 1. Women who
are currently separated are more likely than never married women to respond to question
1. There are no differences in response rates to question 2.
Guinea 2012: There are 9,142 total observations and 8,607 are used in the analysis.
Women with secondary education are more likely to respond to question 1 than women
with no formal education. Women who are widowed or separated are less likely than
never married women to respond to question 1. There are no systematic differences
between those who do and do not respond to question 2.
Guinea-Bissau 2006: There are 10,253 total observations and 6,431 are used. Older
women are more likely to respond to question 2. There are no systematic differences
response rates to question 1.
Mali 1995: There are 9,704 total observations and 8,085 are used in the analysis.
We find that older and more educated women are more likely to respond to question 1.
There are no systematic differences in response rates to question 2.
Mali 2001: There are 12,849 total observations and 10,922 are used in the analysis.
More educated women are more likely to respond to question 1. Women who are
cohabitating with their partner are more likely than never married women to respond to
question 2.
Mali 2006: There are 14,583 total observations and 11,920 are used in the analysis.
Older women are more likely to respond to question 1. There are no systematic differences
in response rates to question 2.
Mali 2012: There are 10,424 total observations and 9,202 are used in the analysis.
Older women are more likely to respond to question 1. There are no systematic differences
in response rates to question 2.
Niger 1998: There are 7,577 total observations and 1,960 are used in the analysis.
Note that the majority of observations are dropped due to missing information for
question 1 and question 2. Older and more educated women are more likely to respond
to both questions. Currently married women are more likely and cohabitating women
are less likely than never married women to respond to both questions.
Niger 2006: There are 9,223 total observations and 3,471 are used in the analysis.
119
Older and more educated women are more likely to respond to both questions. Currently
married women are more likely than never married women to respond to both questions.
Niger 2012: There are 11,160 total observations and 4,474 are used in the analysis.
Older and more educated women are more likely to respond to both questions.
Nigeria 1999: There are 9,810 total observations and 5,096 are included in the
analysis. We find that older women are more likely to respond to both questions. Never
married women are least likely to respond to both questions.
Nigeria 2003: There are 7,620 total observations and 3,242 are used in the analysis.
Older and more educated women are more likely to respond to question 1. Currently
married and divorced women are more likely than never married women to respond to
question 1. There are no systematic differences in response rates to question 2.
Nigeria 2007: There are 36,131 total observations and 10,276 are used in the analysis.
Older and more educated women are more likely to respond to both questions. Never
married and widowed women are less likely than currently married women to respond to
both questions.
Nigeria 2008: There are 33,385 total observations and 15,369 are used in the analysis.
Older and more educated women are more likely to respond to both questions. Currently
married women are more likely than never married women to respond to both questions.
Nigeria 2011: There are 39,932 total observations and 8,268 observations are used in
the analysis. More educated women are more likely to respond to both questions. Older
women are more likely to respond to question 2. Never married women are less likely
than currently married women to respond to both questions. Cohabitating women are
more likely than currently married women to respond to question 1.
Nigeria 2013: There are 38,948 total observations and 21,336 are used in the analysis.
Older and more educated women are more likely to respond to both questions. Never
married women are least likely to respond to both questions.
Senegal 2005: There are 14,602 total observations and 12,244 are used in the analysis.
Older and more educated women are more likely to respond to both questions. Currently
married and cohabitating women are more likely than never married women to respond
to both questions.
Senegal 2010: There are 15,688 total observations and 13,160 are used in the analysis.
We find that older women and those who have attended secondary school are more likely
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to respond to both questions.
Sierra Leone 2005: There are 11,213 total observations and 7,354 are used in the
analysis. Older women are more likely to respond to both questions. Never married
women are less likely than currently married women to respond to both questions.
Sierra Leone 2008: There are 7,374 total observations and 6,579 are used in the
analysis. Older women are more likely to respond to both questions.
Sierra Leone 2010: There are 16,616 total observations and 7,232 are used. Older and
less educated women are more likely to respond to both questions. Never married and
separated women are less likely than currently married women to respond to question 1.
Togo 2006: There are 8,176 total observations and 4,178 are used in the analysis.
Older and more educated women are more likely to respond to both questions. Never
married women are less likely than currently married women to respond to both questions.
Separated women are more likely than currently married women to respond to question
1.
Togo 2010: There are 8,914 total observation and 3,843 are used. Older and more
educated women are more likely to respond to both questions.
A.4 Tables
Table A.1: Cross-Country Regression Results for the Contribution of Various Levels of
Variation to the Variation in Support for FGC
Unobserved
Village Household Individual
Contribution Contribution Contribution
Proportion of Women Who -0.062** -0.122** 0.187***
Have Undergone FGC (0.023) (0.060) (0.064)
Constant 0.150*** 0.716*** 0.123***
(0.014) (0.037) (0.040)
Observations 38 38 38
R-squared 0.166 0.104 0.193
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix B
Appendix—Persistent Norms and
Tipping Points
Table B.1: LPM Estimation Results for Whether Girl Underwent FGC—Squared Term
for Rate of FGC in Community Included
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Province-
Ethnic
Cohort
Department-
Ethnic
Cohort
Province-
Ethnic Rural
Cohort
Province-
Ethnic
Catholic
Cohort
Province-
Ethnic
Muslim
Cohort
Rate of FGC in Community 0.286* 0.311** 0.281 0.395* 0.083
(0.147) (0.140) (0.184) (0.200) (0.250)
Rate of FGC in Community2 0.264* 0.229* 0.274 0.039 0.388*
(0.145) (0.124) (0.182) (0.200) (0.210)
Urban Household -0.036* -0.034 0.030 -0.055**
(0.020) (0.021) (0.039) (0.026)
Religion [Omitted: Catholic]
Protestant -0.035 -0.048 -0.019
(0.030) (0.041) (0.045)
Muslim 0.075*** 0.076*** 0.096***
(0.015) (0.017) (0.021)
Other 0.062** 0.045 0.060
(0.029) (0.035) (0.038)
Constant 0.567*** 0.640*** 0.681*** 0.699* 1.478***
(0.164) (0.183) (0.203) (0.362) (0.211)
Observations 5,934 4,523 3,493 1,079 2,818
R-squared 0.215 0.238 0.229 0.297 0.214
Controls included: Ethnicity, religion, proxies for wealth, rural indicator, polygamy indicator, mother’s
year of birth FE, father’s year of birth FE daughter’s year of birth FE.
Standard Errors Clustered at the Province Level. ***p<0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
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Table B.2: Logit Estimation Results for Whether Girl Undergoes FGC—Marginal Effects
Evaluated at the Mean
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Province-
Ethnic
Cohort
Department-
Ethnic
Cohort
Province-
Ethnic Rural
Cohort
Province-
Ethnic
Catholic
Cohort
Province-
Ethnic
Muslim
Cohort
Rate of FGC in Community 0.767*** 0.758*** 0.782*** 0.550*** 0.699***
(0.062) (0.042) (0.066) (0.099) (0.133)
Observations 5908 4501 3459 1035 2790
Pseudo R-squared 0.170 0.192 0.177 0.135 0.191
Controls included: Ethnicity, religion, proxies for wealth, rural indicator, polygamy indicator, mother’s
year of birth FE, father’s year of birth FE daughter’s year of birth FE.
Standard Errors Clustered at the Province Level.
***p<0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
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